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We have all become democrats in 
theory at a histol'ica"l stage in 
which it has become virtually 
impossible to organize our social 
life in a democratic fashion any 
longel'. 
John Dunn 
i. POLITICAL CYCLES 
Short-term flucvAations and long~term trends 
If we examine the political development of contemporary 
states, over say the past thirty years, we see a rapid 
succession of political regimes and/or government policies. 
Though these changes - in terms of coups d'etat and 
revolutions, the emergence of military regimes, the down-
fall of dictatorships, the declaration of states of 
emergency or martial law - may have been most apparent in 
the Third World, they could also be observed in communist 
states (such as de-Stalinisation in the Soviet Union or 
the spectacular political upheavals in China) and in the 
West (the New Left or 'democratisation' movement in the 
late 1960s, and the more recent new Conservatism). Such 
political changes are often unexpected and not easily 
explained in terms of the. theoretical ,perspectives which 
we have. available for understanding politics and the 
development of the state. ·The prevailing theories of 
political development, whether Marxist or not, tend to 
analyse the functioning and structure of different polit-
ical systems or the role of the state. If they take account 
of political changes they tend to interpret them in terms 
of the transformation from one type of political· "system' 
into another. If, for .example, a trend towards corporate 
representation of political interests is observed, there 
is a st;ropg inclination to project such a tendency into 
the deve19pment.of a new type of political system, 
'corporatism '(in Latin Arneri.ca) or 'neo-corporatism' (in 
Western Europe).1 
But if we want to orient ourselves better in the con-
temporary world, it may be more useful to identify the 
pattern, the particular longer-term structure underlying 
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the relatively short-term fluctuations of political regimes 
and government policies (or 'strategies') which can be 
observed. Are there political cycles, which in some 
respects are similar to the business cycle, that is to 
say, fluctuations which have a pattern which can be ex-
plained and foreseen, even though the precise timespan 
of specific fluctuations -the duration of movements in 
'upward' or 'downward' directions - cannot be predicted? 
To look at fluctuations in this manner implies that 
one sees them as connected to longer-term trends in a 
particular direction. Short-term fluctuations as move-
ments 'forward' or 'backward' (or when graphically 
represented, 'upward' and 'downward') are parts of such 
a longer-term trend. 
One way to describe changes from one regime to another 
is to see them as' a movement from more 'harsh" to more 
'soft' regimes and vice versa. The degrees of 'harshness' 
or 'softness', however, can vary widely between different 
states and between different phases in their development. 2 
'Harshness' and 'softness'" then, are shorthand for the 
degree of poli tic'al repression- as well as the type of 
economic policy or development strategy which a govern-
ment follows. 'Harsh reg'imes tend not only to repress 
opposition but also to favour the intere~ts of the more 
privileged parts of the population, and to pay more 
attention to creating favourable conditions for capital 
accumulation than to take the needs and demands of the 
, less privileged parts of the population into account. 
Harsh and soft are metaphors which nevertheless 
indicate real differences. The question is whether'these 
differences between political regimes can be made more 
specific, and whether it is possible to' connect political 
fluctuations to a longer-term perspective on the develop-
ment of contemporary states. 
-3-
When we speak about 'contemporary' states, that notion 
implies firstly that these states are supposed to coincide 
with Tlaticms, no matter how these may be precisely defined; 
and secondly, that their governments as well as public 
opinion are preocc].lpied with economic development and 
industrialisation. The starting point of this paper is 
that state formation and industrialisation are two inter-
connected but relatively autonomous aspects of an over-
all transformation of society. Industrialisation implies 
an increase in differenti~tion of social functions (i.e. 
specialisation and the development of. a more complex 
division of labour), whereas state formation can be 
expressed as increasing integration of social functions, 
i.e. growth and extension of the coordinating and regu-
lating functions of central institutions based on rel'a-
tively stable mpnopolies of violence, taxation and the 
conduct of foreign relations. Formulated on the highest 
level of abs.traction, industrialisation and state form-
ation· are repsectively the differentiation and integration 
aspect 6f the development of contemporary human societies. 
Movements from harsh to soft regimes and vice versa 
can be observed in practically all contemp,?rary states, 
whether they are classified as capitalist or as. centrally-
planned or socialist, or again, as post-colonial or 
'intermediate' states. In this paper, I shall be concerned 
primarily with the similarities between the developmental 
patterns of all contemporary states, despite the fact 
that they are usually considered to be so completely 
d·ifferent that they are classified as belonging to alto-
gether different 'worlds' - First ,. Second or Third. 
I shall first discuss the differences between dynastic 
states such as China and contemporary industrailising 
nation-states. In dynastic states before the development 
of 'capitalism', a cyclical pattern could be observed, 
especially clearly in the so-called 'dynastic cycle' in 
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China. The difference between. that dynastic cycle and 
political fluctuations in contemporary states is that in 
the latter short-term political fluctuations are connec-
ted to·a longer-term trend, whereas in China political 
cycles were a repetitive pattern within a society that 
changed very little in its structure of social stratifi-
cation. The longer-term trends which first manifested 
themselves in western Europe can be described, on the 
one hand,as industrialisation (the differentiation 
aspect) and, on the other hand, as nation-formation 
(the integration aspect). In both cases the long-term 
trends have contradictory aspects which give rise to 
fluctuations between political regimes. In all indus-
trialising nation-states we see a long-term·contradictory 
trend between, on the one hand, functional democratisation 
and, on the other hand, oligarchisation, connected but 
not identical with tension between what James O'Connor 
has called the accumulation and legitimation functions 
of the state. 
After discussing functional democratisation and 
oligarchisation in more detail, the paper continues with 
an analysis of the similarities of the·structure of· 
political fluctuations in what are commonly conceptualised 
as 'capitalist' and 'socialist' and post-colonial or 
'intermediate' regimes. 
In the conclusion of the paper I shall return to 
·the question of how short-term .fluctuations from 'harsh' 
to 'soft' regimes may be connected to the longer-term 
contradictory trends to be observed in the dynamics of 
development oicontemporary states .. 
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2. THE DYNASTIC CYCLE 
The notion of a political cycle is a familiar tool for 
students of Chinese history. Political change in the 
Chinese empire has been conceptualised by many historians 
in .terms of a dynastic cycle. To cite a classic descrip-
tion of this dynastic. cycle: 
All the great dynasties have an initial period of 
prosperity. The group that has seized the throne is 
relatively small and closely knit. The wars that have 
brought it to power have eliminated most of its rivals, 
and therefore the wealth of the nation pours largely 
into its coffers. The country prospers in its newly 
established peace, the population seems to increase 
rapidly, and the treasuries and granaries of the central 
government overflow. . 
But an excess of yang leads to the rise of yin. The 
affluent central government builds great palaces, roads, 
canals and walls. The imperial clan, the nobility, and 
the high bureaucracy grow in numbers and become accustomed 
to an ever more luxurious mode of life. The very mili-
tary successes of the empire have established far-flung 
defence lines that are costly to maintain. More and 
more lands and their peasant-cultivators are used for 
the personal support of the ruling classes and fewer and 
fewer tax-paying contributors remain to the central 
administration. Because of constantly increasing expendi-
tures and often a slight decline in income, each dynasty 
begins to experience serious financial difficulties within 
a century·of its founding. 
Economic and administrative reforms are then carried 
out and may halt the financial decline for a while. The 
downward trend, however, eventually reasserts itself. 
Economic·and administrative difficulties accumulate. 
Official self-seeking and corruption become worse, lead-
ing to a decline in administrative efficiency and an 
intensification of factional quarrels at court. The 
potential rivals of the imperial family become politically 
and economically more independent of the central govern-
ment and challenge it with greater impunity. To meet 
government deficits, the burden on the tax-paying peasant 
is increased to the breaking point. Because of the govern-
ments' financial difficulties, canals and dikes are 
allowed to fall into disrepair, making floods and droughts 
more probable. Crop failures that once could have been 
offset by stores from the government granaries now result 
in famines, and these lead to banditry and eventually to 
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peasant uprisings. Inadequately maintained frontier 
defences begin to qrumble. ___ PrO'lincial officials and 
their armies begin to defect, and the central govern-
ment starts to go to pieces. Then follow the wars 
that liquidate the old re~ime and clear the slate for 
a new dynastic beginning. 
This is ho doubt a much simplified scheme, which 
as the authors themselves say best fits the development 
of the early Han dynasty. Nevertheless, the combination 
of internal weakening of the government, strengthening. 
of centrifugal forces (warlords), peasant revolts .and 
invasions by nomadic peoples from the North - though in 
different forms,and with differing weight of the four 
elements involved - has occurred time and time again. 
But each time the basic form of the bureaucratic political 
organisation of the Chinese empire was restored again. 
China remained a dynastic state" dependent upon the prod...; 
uction and efficient extraction of an agricultural 
surplus and for a long time also on di'fferent forms bf 
corvee, i.e. forced labour. The development of produc-
ti veforce's, and differentiation of social functions was 
relatively slow and discontinuous. 4 China basically 
remained what Elias has called a two-tier society, 
in which the power differentials between a small upper' 
crust of rulers - courtiers, bureaucrats, scholars and 
warriors - 'and the ruled, the vast majority of which 
were peasants, are very great. 5 Though the number 'of 
merchants and artisans increased considerably in certain 
periods (parti~larly during th~ Sung and Ming dynasties) ,6 
they never acquired a sufficiently large measure of 
power of their own - Chinese cities did not acquire 
autonomy, but remained centres of bureaucratic control-
to affect the basic characteristics of the two-tier 
power balance. 
The )atent conflict in suc'h a ,two-tier society, 
which comes into the open in recurrent peasant revolts 
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and banditry, has been succinctly expressed by the first 
Tang emperor Li Shih Min: 
The emporer likes to have a palace built, but the people 
do not like building it.. Th.e emperor craves the flesh-
pots, but the people hate doing labour service. It is 
dangerous to burden the people with excessive labour 
service ..•. An emperor collecting too heavy taxes is 
like a man eating his own flesh. When the flesh is gone, 
the man dies. 7 
This indicates that emporers could learn from the decline 
of former dynasties how to bette.r maintain their control. 
In this way, for example, the so-called 'equal field 
sy'stem', which was first used in the Northern Wei state, 
was further developed in the early phases of later 
dynasties. The system involved the distribution of waste 
land and public lands among peasants, so that each adult 
would have a small area of land for himself and another 
larger piece for arable farming, out of which the grain 
tax had to be paid. 8 In the Sung dynasty, however, 
developed what Mark Elvin has called 'manorialism with-
out feudalism .... , a new and distinctive social order 
based on the enserfment of" much the peasant population.' 9 
This change was made possible by an 'economic and techno-
logical revolution (which reduced the burden of the 
imperial administrative superstructure, increased the 
efficiency of the Chinese war machine, and created 
enough economic integration to be a real obstacle to 
renewed political fragmentation.,IO 
Elvin's study may demonstrate that the 'dynastic 
cycle' is too s'imple an interpretation of the 'pattern 
of the Chinese past', but, it also shows that China 
remained a two-tier society, in the sense that although 
there were at times spurts in the development of produc-
tive forces, there was no long-term tendency in the 
direction of a reduction of the power differentials 
between social classes and between rulers and ruled. On 
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the contrary, it appears that the power balances may have 
become even more uneven after the economic and techno-
logical revolution of the Sung period. Although serfdom 
disappeared again in the course of the 18th century, 
'the landlord and the pawnbroker .took the place of the 
manorial lord' .11 And if William Hinston's description 
of Long Bow Village is a representative description of 
rural life before the Chinese revolution, the power balances 
remained extremely uneven and found clear expression in 
widely diverging living conditions. 12 The examples of 
cruelty and complete lack of compassion of the landlords 
vis-a-vis the peasants, which Hinton describes, show that 
there was little or no identification between the gentry 
and the peasants in the Chinese countryside. 
The Chinese dynastic state was, in Elvin's words, 
'the world's largest enduring state'. Though dynastic 
China went through regular political upheavals and even 
through an 'economic and technological revolution', it 
remained the same i.n one very important respect: in the 
enduring very high degree of ,unevenness of the power 
balances between rulers and ruled and between social 
classes. Before the impact of western penetration began 
to affect the development of China, there were no signs 
that the Chinese dynastic state was beginning the process 
of transformation from dynastic into nation-state. Dynastic 
states in western Europe, on the contrary, did not go 
through a dynastic circle similar to that of the Chinese 
empire. Compared to China, dynastic states and court 
'society in Western Europe represented a relatively short 
phase in .a continuing longer-term process of social trans-
formation in the direction of nation-states. After 
dynastiC states in Western Europe had reached the culmi-
nation of their development in the period of 'absolutism', 
they rather quickly became 'ancient regimes', considered 
as obsolete even by many of its contemporaries. 
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3. TN'O MEANINGS OF THE TERM 'NATION' 
N'hat are the distinguishing characteristics of nation-
states? What is the relation between the two components 
of the concept: 'nation' and 'state;? N'hat kind of 
entities does the term 'nation' refer to? 
The term 'nation' is rather confusing. In common 
parlance it refers to the social unit which demarcates 
a people, which rightfully and legitimately should have 
its own state - as expressed in the claim that a right 
to national self-determination eXists. 13 Because it has 
proven impossible to find one or more objective criteria 
(such as language, ethnicity, religion, culture etc.) 
with which to determine what group of people forms a 
nation, every nation in this sense has, to a greater or 
lesser degree, to be itivented. 14 In many cases, partic-
ularly inN'estern Europe, the emergency of 'nations' 
followed the development of (dynastic) states. Because 
'nations' have to be invented and 'national' solidarity 
is not a natural or innate property of human beings, 
there is a tendency to develop national ideologies, in 
which the specific 'nation' which is the subject of the 
ideology, is projected as far back into the past as 
possible. IS Presenting nations as eternal, as always 
having been there, also makes them form the 'natural' 
units into which mankind is divided. The further back 
in history one can trace one's own nation and find 
national heroes and other symbols of national unity, the 
more easy it is to develop a strong and self-evident 
we-image as the basis of identification with and loyalty 
to the 'nation,.16 
This strong tendency in national ideologies to 
present the nation as a timeless, natural given, is a 
continuous source of confusion in both political and 
, 
social-scientific discussions about nationalism and the 
characteristics of nations. Renan's question of 'what 
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is a natien?' still has net received a satisfactery, 
unequivecal answer. 17 This is due net enly to. the 
dectrine ef natienalism, but also. to. the fact that it 
is really net ene questien, but two.: 
-Why is it that particular territerial units have ceme 
to. be identified as 'natiens' and net ethers, and why 
have seme 'natiens' thus identified been successful in 
ebtaining their ewn state and ethers net (such as, 
Armenians, Kurds, Ibe's, etc.)? 
-What. is the nature ef the precess ef transfermatio.n ef 
dynastic er ether types ef states (such as celenial 
empires and celenial states) into. natio.n-states? 
To. ask the latter questio.n implies no.t enly that 
'natiens' are a relatively recent phenemenen, but also. 
that the term 'natien' can be regarded as a shert-hand 
expressien fer a develepment in a particular directien. 1S 
That precess can be described in different ways .. 
In dynastic states peeple are treated and see them-
selves as subjects of the King .er Emperer, no.t as fellew 
citizens ef a natien. In dynastic states the centre ef 
pelitical activity is the King'sco.urt. King and state 
are ene: there is no. distinctien between the private 
heuseho.ld ef the King and the public heuseheld ef the 
state. That the term rho.useheld' has been replaced by 
the mere impersenal term 'budget' is itself an indicatien 
ef the nature o.f the change. In dynastic states there 
are no. pelitical parties, but parties ferm the centre o.f 
pelitical activity in natien-states. In dynastic states, 
there is as yet no. need fer ~uch an institutio.nalised 
relatienship between rulers and rUled threugh which 
demands and grievances Qf the ruled can be expressed and 
filteres and within which po.litical leaders are recruited 
and selected. In dynastic states, in ether werds, rulers 
have less need to. take the interests and demands ef the 
ruled. into. acceunt - even theugh rulers can pay dearly 
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if they neglect the interests of their subjects too much, 
as the dynastic cycle in China demonstrates. Because 
this need is much less apparent in dynastic states than 
in most contemporary nation-states - for reasons which 
I shall analyse in greater detail - the degree of identi-
fication between rulers and ruled and between social 
classes as members of a single policy (which later 
became the 'nation') was very low. For aristocrats 
'the people' were a yery different - ahd often expendable -
kind of people than members of their own class. They 
could only identify with and feel compassion for those 
belonging to 'the people' who were their personal servants 
or sub-ordinates - and even then very differently to 
the way in which they would identify with members o'f their 
own class across state borders. This lack of identifica-
tion wi.th a 'nation' also applies to the lower classes. 
At the time the Communist Manifesto .was written, Marx 
and Engels were surely right in stating 'The working 
men have no country. We cannot take from them what they 
have .not got!' But the more the proletariat began to 
transform its latent strength into organised 'power 
through trade unions and political parties, the more 
these organisations acquired a stake in the state and 
,the more 'working men' began to identify, with the 'nation'. 
The clearest manifestation of that development was the 
conduct ,of social-democratic parties in August 1914, 
when the vast majority of their parlementarians voted 
for granting war credi.ts to their respective national 
governments, and working men - at first, at least -
joyfully went to war. During the First World War, 
socialists also for the first time took part in coalition 
governments with 'bourgeois' parties. The development 
of the 'welfare state' strengthened these tendencies 
even further. The la.test phase in this development is 
the so-called EurocoIDrnunism, especially the attempt of 
the Italian communist party to establish an 'historical 
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compromise' with the Christian-Democrats and to join 
._the- g.ov:ernment. .That-cidenti-f-i-cation -with the 'nation' 
proceeded veery slowly - ev:en in the most highly centra~ 
lised European state - as is shown.in .Eugen Weber's 
study of rural dev:elopm'ent in France between. 1870 and 
1914, which he has called Peasants into Frenchmen. 19 
This description of some of the differ.ences between 
dynastic and nation-states should not be misunderstood. 
They should be seen as different aspects of a long-
term dev:elopment in a particular direction, not as 
differences between two static 'systems'. There is no 
clear caesura, no distinct boundary line in the process. 
It. is not the abolition of monarchy ,and ,court aristocracy 
which marks the emergence of the nation-state. The 
French rev:olution undoubtedly marked a strong spurt in 
the dev:elopment towards nation-states in western Europe, 
particularlY,because of the creation of a popular army 
through the 'lev:ee en .masse' (1793) and the emergence 
of Jacobin nationalism, both,contributing to the superior 
strength of the' French. 'national", armies. 20, French 
conquests '. in turn',: kindled national feelings in other 
parts of,Europe, especially in Germany, which ,led to 
strong emphasis being placed on the importance of 
national culture and language in history writing, 
philosophy and the art.s. 21 It also contributed to the 
earliest formulation of the need for 'self-reliance' 
in industrial dev:elopment, as expressed in the writings 
of the German economist, Friedrich List. 
But the rise of Napoleon shows how slowly the under-
lying power balances'changed. Whether a dynastic state 
is transformed through rev:olution as in France, or through 
forcing the monarchy to become 'constitutional' and thus 
gradually mov:ing the centre of power and political 
activ:ity from the King and his Court to gov:ernment and 
parliament, £ormed through the electoral struggle'bet-
ween political parties, has not made all that much 
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difference in the longer run. In a developmental sense, 
all contemporary nations are still - and probably will 
remain - in the process of becoming: they nowhere 
correspond to the idealized image contained in national 
ideoiogies of the"nation' as an harmonious, well-
integrated whole in which all members are guided by the 
same values and can ,participate and share equally.22 
4. A FIGURATIONAL INSTEAD OF A SYST~~S PERSPECTIVE 
The preceding arguments may also demonstrate that for an 
explanation of why these differences between the 17th 
and 18th century dynastic states and contemporary nation-
states have emerged, a structuralist or systems perspective 
is of little help. Such a perspective often leads to 
reifying the state, for example by looking at it as a 
particular set of institutions or apparatuses which 
fulfills functions for an abstractly conceived mode of 
production. The difficulties encountered when starting 
out from such a reified perspective on the state, are 
then often met by simultaneously personifying' the state, 
by endowing it with a will and capacity to plan of its 
own, which make it possible for 'the state' to fulfill 
the role which theory attributes to it. This tendency 
of simultaneous reification and personification can be 
observed in most Marxist attempts to theorise about the' 
state. 23 It is due primarily to the vogue in Marxism 
to regard 'modes of production' as 'systems' or 'struc-
tures", which in their essential features remain the 
same until transformed by or revolution (or at least a 
period of 'transition'), into another system, and which 
in the last instance determine structure and functions 
of the state. 24 
If we want to avoid such reification and personi-
ficatIon of the state; it is preferable to see states as 
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changing figurations of people, who are dependent upon 
each other in-specific ways and who strive--to-better or 
maintain their own position in terms of their own scheme 
of orientation and values.'25 That also makes it possible 
to go beyond the conceptual distinction between 'state' 
and 'society' which gives rise to unnecessarily difficult 
problems of boundary demarcation. The state-society 
distinction reinforces the tendency to reify and personify 
the state, and to see it in instrumental terms, as the 
frequent use of the term 'state apparatus' illustrates. 
It is therefore better to speak of state-societies, ,and 
then to specify the development of their institutional 
make-up, patterns of interdependencies, and power balances. 
In order to understand the dynamics of development 
of contemporary states, a figurational perspective makes 
us see states in terms of a long~term development; the, 
usefulness of this has recently been demonstrated by the 
analysis of the developmental patterns of what political 
antrhopologists have called 'early states,.26 A figura~ 
tional perspective in state formation focuses attention 
on the, interdependencies between rulers and ruled, as 
they are' affected by developments internal to the state" 
unit, ,by the competition between states and by trans-
national interdependencies of various kinds (economic, 
communications, technological, military, etc.). To 
examine the position of rulers implies the need to 
analyse the power rivalries within a ruling establishment -
between cliques, clans, factions and so on - and the way 
in which these rivalries' influence the r'elations between 
the rulers ,and ruled. Although the importance of class 
formation processes for the ,power balances" within the 
state,- particularly in later phases of the development 
of human societies - cannot be denied,comparative analysis 
of early states has demonstrated that ,it is necessary to 
make an analytical distinction between class relations 
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and those between rulers and ruled. 27 Important indica-
tions of the changing nature of state figurations are 
the degree of identification between rulers and ruled 
and between social classes, and the degree to which 
rulers are forced to take into account the i~terests 
and grievances of the ruled. The analysis of state· 
formation processes requires that one does not confine 
oneself to class formation as the primary source of 
political conflict, but should take into account the 
relations between established and outsider groups 
(whether ethnic, religious, caste, regional, or based 
on certain despised professions) as these influence the 
balance between centrifugal forces within the state. 28 
When strong centrifugal forces in the form of nationalist 
or. separatist movements threaten the integrity of a 
state, such established outsider relationships, for 
example, may constitute a separate and distinct contri-
bution to the emergence of 'harsh' political'regimes;2 9 
These remarks are meant only to clarify the theore-
tical perspective on the development of states,.used in 
this paper. As I shall use this perspective to compare 
the political cycles or fluctuations occurring in all 
contemporary states, whether under-developed or advanced 
capitalist or communist, I shall make a few preliminary 
remarks about what one could call the uneven character 
of the state and nation formation process. 
5. THE UNEVEN CHARACTER OF STATE AND NATION FORMATION 
-'PROCESSES' IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 
The development in the direction of ,natipn-states began 
in Western Europe. This is not the place to. discuss 
why it occurred in Western. Europe and not in oth~r 
parts of the world, although that question must be posed 
if one does not want to rely on an ethnocentric explana-
tion of the process. 3D Suffice it to point to two 
important differences: in early Medieval Europe there 
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was only a very meagre supply of prisoners-of-war, made 
into slaves, as a source of cheap labour power. Secondly, 
in western Europe, politically autonomous fortified 
towns could eIllerge within which large group's of people 
were able, to engage in commercial and productive acti vi ties 
on their own behalf" ,without being subjected to the 
specific cOIll.'11.andsand needs of a Court and/or a state 
bureaucracy, as was the case in dynastic states or empires 
in other parts of the world, such as Byzantium, China 
or Siam)l Even though the development of productive 
forces ,reacad" a relatively high level in some earlier 
states, their structure of rule and distribution of 
power was probably the major reason why it did not ' 
con ti'nue in the dynastic states, in which towns remained 
centres of bureaucratic control and/or in which slavery 
fulfilled important productive functions. 
In Western Europe, however, during what we have come 
to call the Middle Ages, the nature of inte'rdependencies 
between rulers and ruled and between sociaiclasses 
began to change in a specific long-term direction - in 
hindsight perhaps best summarised as a development in 
the ,direction of, the formation of industrial nation-
states}2 The dynamic of the early phases cif this process 
is most clearly analysed in Norbert Elias's The Civiliz-
ing 'Process, though that study centres on the inter-
connection between state formation processes and "civiliz-
ing', the observable changes in the personality structures 
of people as individuals. Elias has given little, atten-
tion to the specific structure of development of 'economic' 
interdependencies. 33 He does recognize'the crucial 
importance for state 'formation of 'economic , developments -
increasing agricultural production and surplus, growing 
division 6f labour; expansion of trade and improvement 
of transport', development of techn'ology, increasing use 
of money, inflow of bullion (contributing" for example, 
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to the impoverishment of the landed aristocracy) - but 
uses and describes economic processes as a kind of general 
background condition. Wilterdink has formulated this 
observation as economic processes give the appearance of 
a massive, slowly. moving background that is indispensable 
for understanding what is going on in .the foreground, 
but which themselves are hardly investigated nor explained. 
And he adds: 'In this way, paradoxically, .the Marxist 
assumption that the economy is the conditioning base 
may receive unintended support. ,34 It should be added 
that Elias's own research as published in The Civilizing 
Process and Die Hofische Gesellschaft (Court Society) 
does not take us beyond the French revolution. ,For· 
that reason the interconnection between state formation 
and industrialisation processes is not dealt with in his 
work. The nature and implications of that relationship 
have only recently become much clearer, with the break-
up of ,the: colonial empires o.f 1<1estern Europe into newly 
independent states, claiming to be 'nations' in the 
ideological sense of forming a people which should 
legitimately acquire its own state. The prob,lem of 
'development' - as a process held to be s~sceptible to 
conscious.planning - of the countries belonging to the 
Third World, has clarified the increasing importance for 
late industria.lising countries of strong state institutions, 
able to create the necessary conditions for industrial 
and scientific-technological development 'and increasing 
differentiation of social functions. 35 In 19th century· 
,Western Europe, on the contrary, industria'lisation may 
be said to have been in advance of the develqpment of 
regulative and coordinating institutions the central 
level of the state. 36 
The problems of 'development' and 'dependency' of the 
Third World have starkly illuminated the consequences of the 
uneven character of the development of productive and destructive 
forces (weapOnry) of" means' of organisation' and communic'atlon', 
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. and of state-institutions in different parts of the world. 37 
There -are- tnerefore -a- -nUiiiJJer -ofCver-y- impo-rTant-Ci.ifferences 
betwe.en state formation proce-sses in different parts of 
the contemporary world. These are connected firstly with 
the period and the manner in which countries were im:::or-
porated into the international division ·of labour - with 
its core in the Atlantic seaboard countries of Western 
Europe, afterwards including.the United-States - and 
into different colonial empires. 38 Secondly, they are 
connected with the character of the s-tate and culture 
formation processes of different societies, before direct 
colonial- or· indirect economic, political and cultural 
39 penetration by the West occurred-.· 
vii th the advent of industrialisation, however, and 
the increasingly worldwide character of the network of 
interdependencies - where we need to consider both the 
international division of labour and the international 
balance -of power,. especially the increasingly strong 
influences on Third World states of the conflict between 
the great powers - important similarities can also be 
observed between patterns of state formation processes 
in different parts of the world .. Though they maybe 
in different phases (the development in the direction of 
'nations '_ has gone furthest in the smaller countries 
of Western Europe, much further than in either the 
United States or the -Soviet Unio'n, and alsb much further 
than in the countries of the Third World), we can never-
theless observe a simialr long-term trend in processes 
of state formation. Such similarities - with which this 
paper primarily is concerned - are related to the 
homogenising influences of industrialisation (which have 
brought some analysts to the mistaken inference of 
'convergence' between East and West); to modeling 
influences_emanating from~the western European states, 
sometimes:leading to consciQus imitation of state. 
institutions~ and to the coercive character of competition 
between states, which also has homogenising effects. 40 
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It may be helpful to make use of the_distinction 
between 'pristine' and 'secondary' states, which has been 
developed for the analysis of early states. 41 
Dynastic and nation-states, as they have emerged in 
Western Europe, can be seen as pristine states, in the 
sense that the influences of more highly developed 
states on their own development were minimal and negligible 
for the explanation of the structure of their development 
(though the development of the French absolutist state 
was in a sense the model for other states on the European 
continent, especially Prussia). But the states which 
have emerged out of European colonial empires, can only 
be understood as 'secondary' states in the sense that 
the pattern of their development is heavily influenced 
by 'earlier' states. A little noticed example of this, 
influence may be mentioned here. The claim that colonised 
territories form 'nations', and the use,of symbolic 
referents for nationalist ideologies derived from European 
historical experience, force ruling groups in the Third 
World to give more attention to the needs and demands 
of 'the people' or 'the poor' - be it often oply in 
t'erms of lip-service - than the greatly uneven power 
differentials between rulers and ruled may require. This 
is expressed in the use of populist rhetoric, even by 
highly repressive and conservative military regimes. 
The pressure of the ruled on the rulers in secondary 
states is reinforced by the availability of political 
ideologies - such as Marxism - which have been developed 
in the pristine states of Western Europe, accompanying 
the changes in power balance between rulers and ruled 
and between social classes as they first occurred there. 
The political consequences of industrialisation 
are certainly very important, but industrialisation 
should not be seen as the prime mover to which all 
other developments 'in the last instance' can be referred 
bac~.~~at should be analysed more adequately are the 
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interconnections between industrialisation 'as a world-
.. -wide -process, interstate"' competition arid' the~Inherent­
(or 'relatively autonomous') characteris,tics of state 
formation processes themselves. 42 
6. THE LONG-TERM TREND: THE CONTRADICTION BETWEEN 
DEMOCRATISATION' AND OLIGARCHISATION 
This takes us back to the nature of the iong-term trend 
in state-formation processes, as it began to manifest 
,itself in the ',great transformation' from dynastic 
agricultural to industri'al nation states, first in 
Western, Europe, but gradually acquiring a worldwide 
. "43 
character 'as the result of European expansion. The 
long-term trend is best expressed as a contradictory 
tendency in the direction of both functional democrati-
sation and"oligarchisation. 44 
The earLi,er dynastic-agricultural states were, 
predominantly two-tier societies, in whi'ch 'the balance 
'of power in favour of the upper tier , {"wail very dis-
proportionate, inelastic" and stable', even though the 
interdependence of the"two levels imposes some limitations 
on the conduct of the people belonging to the small upper 
crust of society.45 If' the ru~ers did not respect these 
limitations, they were not able to maintain their 
position, thus, for example, causing ,the 'dynastic cycle' 
to run its course. 
The transformation of dynastic into nation-states 
is one aspect of a changing pattern of interdependencies, 
which gives "rise 'to less uneven, more elastic and less 
stable power balances. What can be observed is ,'on 
the one hand a change in the distributiori of power 
between social strata as well as in the nature of social 
stratification itself {"angJ on the other 'hand a 
change in the distribution of power betw'een governments" 
and governed' .46 
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In connection with the gro,,;ing division of labour 
and the increasWgdifferentiation of the functions which 
people fulfill for each other - which gradually also 
makes ,social stratification much more complex, for 
example in the sense of internal differentiation within 
social classes, as these are circumscribed on the basis 
of a Marxian perspective - the power differentials 
between social classes or strata and between rulers and 
ruled became smaller. 'Democratisation' in this sense 
is thus related to the functions which people fulfill 
for each other - and in that manner to 'industrialisation'. 
Elias has made the very useful distinction between 
'functional' and 'political' democratisation. It can 
take a long time before functional democratisation 
results in the kind of parliamentary multi-party political 
systems, based 'on civil rights such as the right to 
freedom of expression and assembly, which we have come 
to associate with 'democracy'. 
But political democratisation - limiting the power 
of the monarch by binding l.t to a constitution; increas-
ing the competences and power of parliaments; the 
extension of suffrage; the recognition of trade unions 
and the right to strike, and so on - cannot be under-
stood without taking functional democratisation into 
account. A sign of increasing latent strength of lower 
strata in a society is a tightening of 'the never-
ending vigilance .... and the closely-woven net of 
precautions' 'which the ruling power establishment 
employs to keep them,under control. 47 One of these 
precautions can.be to prevent the forming of any type 
of political organisation apart from the organisations 
officially recognised by the state and the ruling mono-
48 polistic party. Because such precautions may remain 
effective for a long period of time, functional demo-
cratisation does not automatically lead to political 
! 
I 
~ 
r 
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democratisation, as the development of the Soviet Union 
and other industrialising communist states has qemon-
strated. But it does imply that the ruling establish-
ments of states within which fupctional democratisation. 
occurs, are forced to pay more attention - in words and 
in deeds - to the needs, demands and grievances of the. 
ruled, of 'the people', than in more stable dynastic 
states, such as China or Siam. Rulers begin to find it 
increasing difficult to rely only on violent repression. 
The previou~ remarks already point to th~ second 
long-term tendency, which can be observed in the develop-
ment of contemporary states:· oligarchistion. The process 
of functional democratisation itself implies the develop-
ment from two-tier state societies to societies in which 
many more levels can be distinguished, between and 
within organisations (including state institutions) and 
. 49 . 
between social strata. Apart from the metaphoric 
distinction between 'high' and 'low' social classes, 
tiers or levels in this sense· have a terri·torial aspect -
such as the central, provincial, district and communal 
levels of government - and a functional aspect - the 
distribution of competences and functions between organi-
sational levels as such, whether these are government 
bureaucracies,. corporations, political parties, trade 
unions or universities. In two-tier societies, being 
relatively undifferentiated, the different kinds of 
levels (stratification, territorial and functional) tend 
to coalesce. In more differentiated societies n·ot only 
do the number of levels increase, but 'levels' them-
selves become more differentiated. This increasing com-
plexity and density of the network of functional 
.interdependencies within states - and at present. also 
across national boundaries - increasingly requires 
coordination and regulation at different levels, but 
particularly at the central level of the state. 50 The 
power of central coordinating and regulating institutions 
increases as the dependence of the ruled upon these 
institutions becomes greater. For that reason a 
continuing tendency towards centralisation and bureau-
cratisation of rule has accompanied the transformation 
from dynastic-agricultural to industrial-nation states. 
These processes in turn give rise to oligarchisation, 
to the concentration of power chances in the hands of 
small-groups of top leaders of the different organisations 
which together form the institutional network of contem-
porary state societies. 51 A symptom of oligarchisation 
at the central level is the declining power of parliaments 
in the most advanced nation-states. But oligarchisation 
processes can be observed not only at the central level 
of the state, but also within organisations such as' 
corporations, trade unions or Michels' classic example, 
socialist parties. 52 At the same time, state institutions 
expanded - most markedly during wars arid in periods 
of economic crisis - and increased their power.' 
If the complexity of the power balances in 
contemporary nation-states is to be properly taken.into 
, . 
account, the concept of a 'ruling class' becomes more 
and more inadequate - even apart from the argument that 
has already been brought forward that it is necessary 
to make a distinction between rulers-ruled and class 
relations. It is no longer an'exaggeration to say that 
bourgeoisie and proletariat, the entrepreneurial and 
working classes'- or the two 'industrial' classes, as 
Elias calls them - have jointly become the 'ruling' 
classes at the central level of some of the most highly 
industrialised nation-states. 53 Power relations between 
members of the two industrial classes are much less un-
even at the central level of the state than at the factory 
level. For this reason, more di~ferentiated conc~pts are 
necessary. Rather than of ruling class or elite, it is 
therefore 'better to speak of the ruling establishment of 
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a state-society,not as a homogeneous monolithic ,power 
bloc, 'but as an antagonistic ,alliance (or coalition of 
less durable, charact!=r). In that manner it becomes, 
possible to take both cooperation and rivalries between· 
rulin~ groups, the different parts .of s,~ch a ruling 
establishment, into account. 
Ol~garchisation arises not only from the growing 
need for coordination. and regulation in increaSingly 
differentiated societies; it is also connected with the 
monopolisation processes which result from the coercive. 
dynamic of competition, as expressed in Fichte's dictum' 
. . 
'whose power dpes not increase, while that of others 
does, declines,.54 Elias has demonstrated that the 
'monopoly mechanism' has been the underlying dynamic of 
. .; \ ,.t '. 
the formation of ,dynastic states.and still continues to-
day in the competition between states. On the basis 
of such· a criterion, contemporary states can be distin-
gu.ished"'between great powers ,that parti~ipate in the 
competitive struggle, and middle and' .small powers that 
have successivel~ been ,eliminated from the struggle and 
have become to a greater or lesser degree dependent upon 
one (or more) of the great powers, be it as formal' or as 
informal allies. Such dependence may be reduced if it 
is possible to playoff great powers against .each other. 55 
The increasing importance of inter,state rivalries and 
of transnational interdependencies, makes it likely 
that the power balance between rulers and ruled within 
states will be tilted i~ favour of the' first. 56 
Interstate competition .and especially war thus also helps 
to strengthen the .central institutions of the state, 
particularly of the military. 
Power balances w~thin industrialising, states -·and 
the process of.industrialisation itself - are also strongly 
inf,luenced by monopolisation processes in the sphere of 
production (incll:!ding commerce, banking, transport and 
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other services). The monopolisation of means of produc-
tion results not only in class formation: ih the division 
and assymetrical interdependence between those who 
control means of production and those who do not and are 
therefore forced to sell their labour-power on the market; 
it also leads to the emergence of a few oligopolistic 
corporations, whose activities increasingly become global 
or transnational and show less and less respect .;. unless 
forced to do so - for the priorities of national economic 
policies. 57 Leaving the power balance between governments 
and multinational corporations aside, it is surely the 
case that the monopolisation of control over means of 
production contributes to oligarchisation within nation-
states. But it is useful once again to point to, the 
counter-tendency: the more that certain chances are 
monopolised, the more dependent the monopolist becomes 
on his dependents for administering and preserving those 
chances. In this way,functiorial democratisation also 
manifests itself within large corporations and is 
expressed in the present drive towards partiCipation 
and seif-mahagement. De Swaanhas conceptualised the 
continuing consequences of functional democ'ratisation 
as the transition from 'command' to 'negotiation' 
figurations and has analysed its implications not only 
for the development of the state and organisations' with-
in state's, but also for the personality structures of 
individuals. 58 
It seems tempting for politicians and social 
scientists to focus selectively on one aspect of the 
overall process oj: development of industrialising nation-
states and to project that into the future as a single 
trend. But it may be more realistic to perceive the 
contradictory nature of the process and the continuing 
tensions and problems to which it gives rise. Neither 
oligarchy nor democracy are possible as 'systems', one 
could say. 
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To ideritify the contradiction between democratisa:tion 
and oliga-rchisation asa .long-_term tendency shar_ed,.J:::ly_aJ,;L_ 
industrialising nation-states, does not imply that the, 
similarities between them are more important than the 
differences. For people living 'in contemporary. states, the 
differences are probably more important t'han the similarities. 
How should the differences be analysed? We can 
make a distinction between different kinds of power 
resources, the distribution of which largely determines 
the ,degree of unevenness of the power balance between 
rulers and ruled and between- social classes or strata. 
For the purpose of analysing state formatiOn processes 
the most important p.ower resources are: means of violence, 
means of taxation, means of production, means of 
organisation, and means of orientation. 59 The' differences 
between contemporary states can 'be clarified 'first by 
looking at the degree to which these power resources 
are monopolized or fragmented and, secondly, if they 
are monopilised, by asking 'how many of these monopolies 
are controlled by the' ,ruling establishment of the state. 
In most communist states all five major power resources 
are to a veri great extent monopolised and controlled 'by 
that ruling establishment. In most capitalist states 
the means of organisation and orientation are less 
monopolised, the means of production are controlled 
primarily by oligopolistic corporations, and only the 
means of violence and taxation are monopolised centrally 
by the state. Such differences become clear if the 
position of 'dissidents' in the Soviet Union is compared 
with that of the 'left' .opposition in Western Europe. 
'State institutions' and 'capitalist class' may form such 
strong coalitions, however, ,that states with more dispersed 
power resources can become highly authoritar,i_an and 
repressive. Examples are not difficult to find - we have 
only to think of Chile, South Africa or El Salvador. 
But such coalitions - if they do not receive external 
support - are likely to be less stable than the combina-
tio~.of five central monopolies in communist state~ as 
justified by the doctrine of· 'the dictatorship of the 
proletariat,.60 The differences between one-party and 
multi-party states, or between 'hegemonies' and 
'polyarchies' in Dahl's terminology, are enormously 
important for· the people living in them. 61 But the 
similarities between these types should not be obscured. 
To compare is to look for similarities as well as 
differences. The purpose of making comparisons is often 
misunderstood as a search for identical cases. Thus 
people wi 11 say: 'But you ca -no.t compare x with y', when 
what they really mean is:'I consider the differences to 
be mUcfl more important than. the similarities'. Such 
weighing is a matter of judgement and judgements are 
usually made on the basis of ideological preferences 
and guided by the question 'who or what is to. blame? ,62. 
If·political or ideological judgements did not inter-
fere with attempts to describe and explain the develop-
ment of human societies, it would not· be necessary to 
object. But, all too often they do, in the ·sense that 
they make people focus selectively on certain inter-
connections and events and make them blind to others .• 63 
That in what follows I shall focus on similari.ties 
between the developments of different kinds of state-
societies ,. therefore, does not imply that I consider 
them to be '90mpa~able' in the sense that in my own 
judgement the similarities are more important than·the 
differences. 64 
7; SHORT-TERM FLUCTUATIONS AND 
POLITICAL REVOLUTIONS 
If we want to understand the short-term fluctuations in 
the development of contemporary states - the coming and going 
of political regimes.and the shifts in government policies 
or 'development strategies' - they should be seen· against 
the backdrop of the long~term contradiction between demo-
cratisation 'and oligarchisation. To explain specific 
fluctuations, it is also indispensable to examine the relation 
between regime change, the international economic situation 
and/or position of 'the . country concerned, and its international 
political position. Such connections may be quite direct, 
as for· .example in the recent case of Afghanistan or the 
1970 coup·of Lon Nol et al against.Shihanoukin Cambodia. 
Specific fluctuations may also .be connected with long-term 
trends in the world economy, which might make it possible. 
to discover·.movements in 'the same direction in a number of 
states at the same time. But I am not able here to analyse 
J:l:J.e inte};,connectj,onS. betweenlong;...term trends and short-term 
fluctuations in the development of the world economy - the 
research of which is also at a very early stage - and similar 
movements in state formation processes. 65 That there are 
such connec.tions islikelY'i but our knowledge about long-term 
development proce.ssesis probably not yet sufficient to enable 
us to ma,ke re.asonably grounded conjectures about them. 
In what follows I shal·l therefore be concerned primarily 
with the immanent, relatively autonomous, dynamic of the 
development of contemporary states. 
To clarify the similarities in the long-term dynamic 
of state formation processes, as it manifests itself in 
short-term fluctuations between 'harsher' and softer' regimes 
and policies, I shall dis.cuss the work of three authors, 
concerned in turn with capitalist industrial states, in 
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particular the ,United States; communist states, in particular 
the Soviet Union; and 'underdeveloped' or 'peripheral 
capitalist~ states. 66 
.. One more preliminary remark should be made. None of 
the theories that I shall discuss deals with ,the more 
drastic discontinuities instate formation procecsses, which 
are commonly conceptualised as 'revolutions '. 67 'However, 
even though successt:ul revolutions imply.a radical change 
in the recruitment of the ruling establishment and the 
nature of the political regime of the state in question, 
they have so far not resulted in a reversal o£ long-term 
-tendencies in state formati,on processes. On the contrary, 
revolutions as well as the threat of revolution, have ,re-
sulted in strengthening and expansion of state institutions, 
and in strong spurts of centralisation ,q.nd bureaucratisation. 68 
For that reason, some social scientists speak ,0£ the 
'etatisation' of revolutions. That term explains ,little, 
however, it only indicates the conflict between the pro-
fessed aims of revolutionaries and th~' effect~ ,0£ revolutions. 69 
That state institutions are strengthened afi;:era rev.olution 
has to do with the need for consolidation of political 
control of the new ruling establishment; ,with the need 
feit by the new rulers - and which, they use to justify, 
their rule - to stimulate and expa~dproductive forces 
and increase the relative power position of their own 
, , , 70 
state vis-a-vis other states. 
8. 'SHORT-TERM FLUCTUATIONS: THE TENSION 
BETWEEN 'ACCUMULATION' AND 'LEGITIMATION' 
The study of ,revolutions belongs to the analysis of long-
term contradictions in the develo~~ent of contemporary 
states and to the uneven character of industrialisation and' 
state formation processes in the world as a, whole,' rather 
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t~a~ tq th~ $t~q¥ gf short~term fluctu~tions. But it is a 
questio,n, of degree - and there are revolution,sand revolu-
tions, so the J:)oundary lines are again diffioult to draw~ 
In what fo++ows I ~~gll shoW ~hat g pattern of short~ 
term po1:i, tical nuctua,tiqrl!;i 'cia~ bE;! "qbserve<i! in,aJ,.:). c;::on-
tef!1Porar-¥ l:jtgtes ;'w~ether 'capita.list", .' socia:j.ist.' or 
'p,?stcolonia:),.".. ':l:'he workE.! of three Clgt.1'\ors wi+l l::>(: used 
in ,iLL.ust'ratio'!:\s; 'a.nci a,nalys:\,ng the.se. pa,tte.rns; .;rames 
0' Conno:t'" S ,The Fiscal Crisi's 'of the 'Sta,t.E;!; A,la,,tn Besancon's 
The Soviet S~ndi::'ome; and Micj1ael Ka.+ecki'E; work on 'inter-
meqiate regimes', 
,The anlilysis, Of'po+iCj,cal f1;uctuatibns short of 
revo+ut,tons cim ,benefit from the -analysis of 'the ':fiscal 
cr-isis of the (State' a,s i.tncieitaken by the Amer'ican Marxist, ' 
eoonomist James O'connor,"7.l O'Connor himself i's 'primarily' 
concerned w11:1'\ :i,~prqv.i;ng tp,e' Ma,rxist theor-y of the cgpitalist 
state, but his model 'provides ;a useful starting-point 
fqr understandinc::rthec'd!rnamic .o:E,politica,l flgctua.t,tqns 
iJ;l the' f!10!?t' highly' industrial:i.sed iraho~""states in Western 
,Eurqpe', and the'United states; 72 0' Gon,npr' s empirical 
material is derived £rom the development of the United 
States from'the1950s to the early 1970s. Thou~h he 
does not say so explicitiy, hi~ model can be interpreted 
as indicating that the'collapse of capitalism will not 
arise out ,of ';capi :tal logic " or 'directly out of the struggle 
between classes, but 'olit'of'the breakdown bf the state, 
which may result from the combined effects of the 'fiscal 
crisis' and of the political struggle directed primarily 
against the state}3 
0' Connol:" s mode,l i,EL bas,ed on a functional aJil'sumption. 74 
In his own words: 
Our first premise is that the capitalistic state must try 
to fulfil two basic and often mutually contradictory fun-
ctiqns-accumulation'and legitimization. This means that 
the st,ate m)lst try. to maintain or create thE;!' co'ndi tioIls 
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in which profitable capital accumulation is possible. 
However, the state also must try to maintain or create 
the conditions for social harmony. A capitalist state 
that openly uses its coercive forces to help o"ne class 
accumulate capital at the expense of other classes loses 
its legitimacy and hence undermines the basis ,of its loyalty 
and support. But a state that ignores the necessity of 
assisting the process of capital accumulation risks drying 
up the source of its own power, the economy',s surplus 'pro-
duction capacity and the taxes drawn from this surplus 
(and o.ther forms of capital). 75. 
The two main state functions both involve increasing 
government expenditures. Though it is often difficult to 
allocate specific expenditures (such as education, transport, 
preventive medicine, etc.) to either accumulation or legiti-
mation, it is possible to say that expenditures fulfill one 
function more than the other, and on that basis to make a 
rough assessment of the bias contained in public budgets as 
a whole- as this is expressed in the popular slogan 
'guns or butter". The accumulation function is served, 
for example, by expenditures on research and development; 
on the military,· especially weapons production; on the 
infrastructure of roads, 'airports, harbours, etc.; on 
maintaining the natural"environment in reasonably good 
condition; on more specialised kinds of education, and so 
on. According to O'Connor, , the primary beneficiaries of 
accumulation expenditures are the large corporations 
('monopoly capital') and the more privileged parts of the 
population. Legitimation is served by expenditures for 
, , , 
the extension of what has come to be called the 'welfare' 
or service state: social security, old-age pensions, health 
services, remedial and recurrent education, and so on. 
O'Connor's argument is that ,in capitalist states both kinds 
of expenditures are necessary and that. they condition each' 
other's increase 'because of the inherent.' dynamic ,of, the 
capitalist mode of production: :successful accumulation' 
is always uneven, unbalanced, filled with contradictions, 
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creating poles of wealth and poverty, regional under-
development, decline of small busil,1ess, environmental costs, 
76 ' ' ' . 
etc. On the other hand~ 'the growth of the state sector 
is indispensable to the expansion of priirate iridustry; 
'particularly monopolistic industries'. 77 There are thus 
cumulative pressures which make both kinds of expenditures 
increa,se continuously. State expenditures tend to· rise more 
rapidly than the means of financing them. It could be 
added that the interaction of the two functions contributes 
to the expansion of state institutions, which ~dvance their 
own interests and thus also contribute to increased expend-
iture. 
As profits continue to be appropriated privately, 
howevEP::". and the, tax capacity of, the population is limited -
tax reyolt,s and 'black circuits' develop - a 'fiscal 
crisis of the state' is the .result. Though t,he recent world-
wde rec.ession and ,economic crisis has clearly intensified 
the fiscal crisis, O'Connor has based his analysis on, 
what has occurred during the economic boom period of the 
1950s and 1960s. He has therefore re,cently again emphasiz~d 
'that t:\1e,fiscal L-sbcia~) crisis retains its own specificity 
and has, its own independent relationship to the general 
crisis,.78 ' 
What O'Connor hints at, but does, not fully take into 
account, is the re],ative autonomy of the dynamic of state 
formation proce'sses vis-a.-vis economic development or , 
'capital logic'. But he remains, tied to a conception 
of the state as developing and functioning primarily for 
'capital': 
The first, basic thesis presented here is that the 
growth of the', state sector and state spending is functioning 
increasingly as the basis for the growth of the monopoly 
sector and total'production. Coriverseiy, it is argued 
that the,growth of state spending and state programs is 
the result of the growth of the monopoly ,industries'. 
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For that reason his model is based on the assumption 
that the capitalist state must try to fulfill the two basic 
and contradictory functions of accumulation and legitimation -
an assumption which is not linked in any way to a theory 
about the longer-term developmeI'!t of the state. That the 
'leg'itimation' function of the state becomes more and 
more important, for example, is not only due to the increas-
ing need of 'socialisation' ('statisation' would be a 
better term, if it did not sound so awkward) of costs and 
the destabilising effects of 'successful accumulation', 
but also to the consequences of 'functional democratisat~on'. 
What O'Connor's model lacks is a clearer. perspective on 
the development of 'state functions in relation.:to changing 
power balances in 'capi.talist' states. It also suffers 
from the disadvantage that it is based .on the .development· 
of the United States, which is not only .a capitalist state 
but also a great power, involved .in.military,-strategic 
competition. 7,9 Comparative analysis .would, for, example; 
have shown that not all capitalist states Can be described 
as 'warfare-welfare states', ,in which the 'structural determ-
inants of both military spending and we~fare outlays are 
broadly the. same' .80 0.' Connor uses the term,' state' as a 
synonym for the composite whole of. government, bur.eaucracy 
and other state institutions, without further specifying its 
structure and. development,. 
Nevertheless, O'Connor's analysis of the tens~on between 
the accumulation and legitimation functions of 'capitalist' 
states is an important contribution to the. analysis of 
political development (and a considerable improvemen:t on 
most Marxist theories of the capitalist state). It can 
fulfill an orienting function, in the sense that it is 
possible to regard' 'accumulation' .and 'legitimation' as, 
shorthand expressions for two more or .less contradictory 
foci of government policy. In that manner political regimes 
and the ,fluctuations between regimes can be characterised in 
terms of whether they primarily stress the accumulation or 
the legitimation function. 
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If ci-'fiscar crisis'- is-Tride-ed eTtlier- a lotig-'term 
problem or a continuing trend (O'Connor's position in 
this respect is not quite clear), the way 'in which a regime 
deals with it (the manner in which cuts in government 
expenditures and price increases are distributed among 
different groups of the population) will be an additional 
criterion to assess the nature of political fluctuations. 
It provides a possibility to define the left-right spectrum 
in terms of the degree in which priority is given to either 
accumulation or legitimation, rather than in terms of a 
progressive-conservative distinction, with its unavoidably 
normative or teleological connotations. An analysis of 
party programmes could show the differences in this respect. 
It would even be possible to observe shifts in priorities 
overtime within different political parties. The social-
democratic parties in Western Europe, ,for example, have in 
recent years shown increasing awareness of the fact that 
too much 'stress on 'legitimation' may begin to endanger the 
international'competitive position of their'national economies, 
so that. state expendi tur'es for accumulation: - in terms of 
industrial restructuring, stimulation of 'innovation', etc -
need to be emphasized more 'than before. This shows again 
that'political fluctuations have to be connected with changes 
in international interdependencies - though it will be far 
from easy to assess their relative weight in specific' cases. 
For that reason, political fluctuations are very difficult 
to 'predict, being connected not only with the development of 
the domestic political and economic situation, but also with 
the development of Interstate competition, the world economy, 
and the reiative position of a particular state or 'national 
economy' within it. 
Short~term political fluctuations, however, have their 
own, relatively autonomous dynamic. If a regime comes into 
power which stresses accumulation expenditures to the detriment 
of legitimation expenditures, it will encounter increasing 
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resistance. Veters will rally to. an eppesitien pregramme 
which premises to. pay mere attentien to. legitimatien expenses. 
The precess also. eperates cenversely. When legitimatien 
expenditures and the accempanying institutienal develepments 
(such as the rise ef a welfare and mere recently ef a 'well-
being' establishment) are given tee much weight, a mevement 
in the centrary directien may be ebserved. There is, ef 
ceurse., a relatienship with class struggle,. in the sense. 
that the entrepreneurial class is likely to. stress accumul~ 
atien expenditures and the werking. class. legitimatien expend-
itures; but stratificatienand institutienal differentiatien 
(increase in number ef levels) have beceme so. cemplex tha~ 
the model ef a bipelar class. struggle is ef enly limited use. 
A cemplicating facter is that pelitical parties are still 
tied to. pelitical ideelegies that have emerged frem nineteenth 
century preblems and cenditiens. a1 
Fer the mement, I de net want t.o take.any 'an:alysis further 
than the argument that pelitical Auctusl.ians 'areeemerging frem 
the cembinatien ef the leng-term ce.ntradi:ci::ery trend tewards 
.beth eligarchisatien and demecrat,isatien, and the centinue.us 
tensien between the accumula tien and., l.egi timatien functiens, 
which can beth be ebserved in centempe,rary industrial parlia-
mentary demecracies(er advanced capi:talist states). To. 
analyse the develepment ,of centempera.ry states en the basis 
ef such a perspective, will also. help to.' further clarify the 
distinctien between rulers-ruled and class relations. In 
terms ef ebservable interdependencie.s, the relatiens between 
rulers and ruled at.! different levels beceme mere and mere 
impertant, while the ,impertance ef class relatiens declines. 
'Rulers' mere and mere assume the character ef impersenal, 
cemplex erganisatiens, w.i th 'staff' and 'line' functiens, 
with sub-erganisatiens':with a reasenable degree ef autenemy, 
and so. en. Organisatiens (whether state institutiens er 
cerperatiens) have empleyees and clients; eften the employees 
are mere privileged than the clients, whether the latter are 
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consumers" of products or of services ~ The -more the-welfare"-
or service state expands, the' more the ruled will become 
'clients' of state institutions. And at the level of the 
factory or other organisational units, the internal levels 
of the organisational hierarchy have become major determinants 
of the· distribution of income. as well as of power chances. 
The increase in levels in the organisation hierarchy accounts 
for increasing differentiation within the working class. 
Class in the dichotomous sense is still important at the 
central level of· the state: wage ~egotiations are held 
between representatives of the organised working class .and 
the organised employees, with state institutions playing a 
role which can stretch from·mediation to command. _ But the 
representatives of the organised working class have themselves 
become part of the.ruling.establishment. Within trade unions 
there is also oligarchisation - and a pattern of relations 
between rulers and ruled. We also see attempts to break the 
trade unions' monopoly (or oligopoly) by the development of 
'wild' labour movements and organisations. 
Fot .these reasons models of contemporary state-societies 
cannot be developed on the basis' of class interdependencies 
only. The tension between 'accumulation' and 'legitimation', 
which apparently becomes greater as functional democratisation 
proceeds, is a better starting point from which to examine the 
connection between power balances at different levels of 
contemporary 'capitalist' states. 
8. SHORT-TERM FLUCTUATIONS: WAR COMMUNISM AND NEW ECONOMIC 
POLICY 
Can we observe similar short-term fluctuations - related to 
the long-term contradictory trend towards democratisation and 
oligarchisationand to the tension between the accumulat-ion 
and legitimation functions of the state - in industrialising 
communist states, such cis the Soviet Uni'on? 
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I would submit that our unders'tanding of the Soviet 
Union - or for that matter of all other states in which 
communist ideology fulfills important functions - could 
benefit from an analysis in such terms. It "is too often 
hampered by that ideotogy: either because the course of 
development of the Soviet Union is attributed to the evil 
inherent in communist ("Marxist-Leninist) ideology, or 
because the purpose of the analysis is to explain (or 
excuse) the gap between the professed aims and expected 
outcomes of the ideology and what has in fact happened. 
That makes it very diff'icult, if not impossible, to take 
the'real significance of such a monopolistic state ideology 
into account, and to acquire a more adequate perspective on 
the differences and similarities between stat~s in which 
the ruling establishment controls a greater or: smaller 
number of monopolised power resources. 
Much energy has recently been devoted to examining 
whether the Soviet Union can ,still be labelled 'socialist', 
even if it is admitted that it is a bureaucratically o'r' , 
otherwise 'deformed' socialism. 82 To des'ignate the sc)'vie:t 
Union a 'real' or 'actual' socialism implies that it is 
still in a period of 'transition', first towards socialism 
proper, and ultimately to the final stage when history will 
be transcended and a classless, society will be re-established. 
The most recent trend, however, is to break the link between 
the Soviet Union and s"ociaiism by asserting that it has, 
become a new, type of class society" a society of the Soviet-
type, based on the 'Soviet mode of production', which is 
not' moving towards 'socialism' but tends either·, to reproduce 
itself or to succumb through crisis and revolution. 83 In 
that manner one can unreservedly criticize the Soviet Union 
but remain a ,Marxist, use the Marxian class concept to 
analyse the Soviet Union 'and, other communist states" and 
reserve the term 'socialism' for something that does not 
yet exist ('a socialism that still has to be invented'), 
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84 but _remains" 'necessary' _")3Ut"" eVen" then,_the _influence 
of the capitalist-socialist dichotomy" and the conceptual 
apparatus that goes with it, tends to determine the set-
ting and limits of the analysis. It is still "difficult 
to come to grips with thepeculiarit:i,es of the Soviet 
Union, because the same distinction and the same " conceptual 
apparat,us is used for se,lf definition and self-justification 
by the ruling establishment. in that country.aS As the 
Fre.nc~, poli tical scientist Alain Besancon, whose, modeH of 
the,cyclical ch~racter of the development of the Soviet 
Union I shall discu,ss in, this paragraph, has remarked: 
'/J.he] I\Iain difficulty of [fomprehensionof the Soviet 
U~lioriJ" consists in :t;emaining mentally witpin a universe 
whose coordinates bear no' relationship to our own." This 
sensation of pas~ing thro~gh, the 108king-glass is clisagree-
able and psychologically qifficult to tolerate for very" 
86 " " 
,long.' " For ,that, ,reason," ,there is, ,as Besancon says, the 
danger of naivete, of accepting the ideological self~ 
definition and'self-justification of the ruling establish-
ment at face "value: 'granting.a ul')iversal value. to notions 
that ,assume their aU,thentic meaning only in the sphere 
defined by ideology'", Accord:i,ngly, 
'The naive man., for example" will call a regime where 
sovereignty belongs to "all citizens a democracy, although 
the latte~ term should designate a regime where sovereignty 
belongs t,o the Communist PartY,alone; will call an. equitable 
sharing of property ainong citizens social justice, when the 
te,rm should, mean putting all property at the disposal of 
the Communist Party alone; wi,lI, call the autonomy of 
citizens liberty, when the latter should really refer to 
the free will of the Communist Party.' 87, " 
For those of uswho'donot live in a country in which 
the ruling establishment monopolises the means of orienta-
tion (implying in, practi'ce that all official discOurse, 
newspapers and other mass medla are conducted in the 
- 39 -
'wooden ianguage' of the monopolistic state ideology), 
some measure of naivete is difficult to avoid. In an 
interview with the Russian writer Georgy Vladimov, 
Chairman of the Moscow group of Amnesty International, 
I asked whether there was any relation between the way the 
Soviet Union in its foreign policy increasingly talked 
about 'peace' and the domestic political si tuat·iol1. 
Vladimov answered: 
All that talk about 'peace' is just for the foreign 
market. That is Soviet language. A .friend of.mine· 
. has been obsessed for a long, t,ime with a plan to make 
a dictionary bf o£"ficial Soviet language. If Soviet 
newspapers begin to discus.s ,the, furt-her· extens'ion of 
democracy, it means that a new wave of repression 
is to be expected. If they talk, about fu:r:ther'dev'elop": 
ment of international contacts, it means less people 
will be allowed to travel abroad, apart from,KGB employees. 
That is the interesting thing about it: if yOU read the.' 
newpapers consciously and unde,rst'and that larig1;lage'cyol;l'll 
see that· they tell the truth;. only in words which expresl? 
exactly the opposite 6f what they normal.ly mean. ' The mean-
ing of the words contains the lie. Most peopie., here, know 
the real meaning and see through the lies, but they don't 
mind so terribly because they know that such language is 
intended for the use of foreigners.88 
For these reasons it seems better to speak, o.f ' c ' 
'communist' rather than of 'socialist' states as 
'communism' most adequately designates 'the, monopolistic. 
character and content of the ideology of the ruling 
establishment. 89' Important goals that derive. :from the, 
ideology include industrialisation, be it" of a special 
character, and, to a large extent, 'catching up with 
. , . . 
the' West' (which may mean two things: catching up with 
American military-stra,t~gic power or. catching up with 
the living standards of the OECD countries), although 
this is heard less frequently since the disappearence of 
Khrushchev from the political scene. The most suitable 
label, therefore, is probably that of 'communist industrial-
ising. states' as a di,sti-nct category" even though interna'l 
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differences _wi thin that . category c_are ,considerable. 
The purpose of these remarks is to indicate briefly 
the difference .in,context within which short-term fluctua-
tions occur, a context in which ide()logy and the totalitarian 
aspirations of 'Party and State ' .. are the most important 
durable elements. In his stimulating long essay, The 
'sovietSyndrome~ Alain Besancon has suggested that the 
development of the Soviet Union is best understood in 
terms of 'very pronounced oscellations from one model 
of Soviet policy to another: War Communism and .NEP, or 
Nell, Economic Policy. 9.0 Besancon is aware of" the . 
. drawbacks iri naming two political models,' or two ideaf 
types, after two unique and unreproducible historical' 
situations.' But, he say's: 
these ni;lI~~s a'iso designate two political, lines of the Party 
which have been employed' since the very first years of the 
regime', and which I believe will be revived in future 
'contexts'. These models do not: exist in their pure state: 
they are 'analytical ,tools for interpreting concrete 
'situations. 91 . ",: . ' 
To Besancon, the Soviet Union is 'a state unlike 
any other', 'having been born of a theory' .92 The basic 
difference with other states is that the Soviet union has 
emerged from, 'and is based'on, an ideolgoy which seeks 
to:transform society to its own image. Movements from 
the one'policy line to the other result from the re-
clacitrance of 'civil society', from the fact that people 
are not easily moulded according to a preconceived design. 
This could also be formulated in terms of the relations 
between central planning and unpianned processes having 
a dynamic and direction of their own. 
Besancon describes the movement as follows: 
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By 'War communism' I mean the Communist Party's efforts 
to force civil society to become a part of the plan· pre""' 
determined by thei ideology. In 1917 the Communist 
Party had a clear vision of the form that society spontan-
eously woulda'ssume,once 'bourgeois' power was overthrown 
and 'prqletarian' power, as represented by the Bolshevik Party, 
was established. Things did nO.t go as expected. Social 
groups, individuals and economic developments followed 
a course that was entirely different from the one predicted. 
War Communism, therefore, was a violent effort to .force 
things and men into the sphere in which the Party thought 
and acted. 
By 'NEP' I mean a certain relaxation of ideological 
power, and a certain latitude given to civil society to 
organize as it saw fit. The NEP was born of the failure 
of War Communism. Those in power had come to realize 
that, as they gradually extended their'violent control 
over civil society, the latter was being killed, while the 
new institutions projected for civil society remained 
stillborn. If they persisted in this direction, power it-
self risked collapsing because, as it extended its 
coercive force to the totality of men and things, the 
wellsprings of that force ran dry.93 
The first movement from the 'harsh' policy line of 
war communism, -di~ected to implem~ntation of the ideology 
and to the primacy of 'accumulation', towards the 'soft' line 
of NEP, in which first the peasants and later the population 
as a whole gained 'breathing space' and more opportunity 
to organise their lives in accordance with their own 
priori ties and values, ·was quite clear. But the inter-
connections were complex: the introduction of the first 
NEP in March 1921 coincided with a successf~l atte~pt 
to prevent 'fractionalism' within the Party, which resulted 
in 'the vesting of what was in .effect a monopoly of power 
in the central organisation of the.party,.94 In the Soviet 
Union short-term fluctuations may have combined with a 
long-term trend, in ,which oligarchisation was more 'pro-
nounced than functional democratisation. But the recurrence 
and longer 'duration of NEP phases demonstrates that'functional 
democratisation is nevertheless present. However, the tendency 
to interpret NEP phases, such as the long one that started 
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after the death of Stalin, as a sign of continuing 
'liberalisation' - the hope cherished during the 1960s -
, ,.. . 
proved to be mistaken. As Wallerstein has remarked, 
Times that have been socially defined as 'good' seem to 
correlate with the flourishing of assumptions of 
steady-state progress. Times that have'been socially 
defined as 'bad' or 'troubling' see:rn to give renewed 
impetus ,to varieties of cyclical theo~ies, which after 95: 
all offer reassurance that the 'pad' kS only temporary. 
But it is more realistic- as Wallerstein himself suggests -
to start from the assumption of a combination of 'cycles' 
and 'trends'. Such an analysis'has not ,yet been made for 
the Soviet Union; Besancon's model of, cycles within a 
'system' (or what I would prefer to describe as the durable 
context of the five monopolies controlled, by Party and, 
state institutions) is therefore a step forward. His 
description of the short-term fluctuations - War Communism I; 
NEP I; Stalin's War Communism II; the co1lectivisation of 
agriculture through terror; NEP II during World War II; 
War Communism III immediately after 1945; NEP III after 
Stalin's death in 1953 - 'which could only be of long 
duration', show that the accumulation-legitimation tension 
is ahlO quite important in the Soviet Union. The,political 
effects of'the'tension between these two state functions 
are different from those in capitalist welfare states, 
however, if only be9ause of the impact of ideology. 
For that reason, f'lccording,to Besancon, neither further 
'liberalisation' nor transformation into an authoritarian 
state is possible: 'the ideological regime canno:!: be 
trans,formed into a tyrannical regime without losing 
its reason for existence, which is to impose,pseudo~reality 
by force and to obtain a declaration of allegiance from 
everyone' . 
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Becancon mentions the kolkhoz as an example: 
To the eyes of the uninitiated it is .... a sort of slave 
plantation, directed by an external bureaucracy and under 
the surveillance of a system of repression.. The serfs 
receive their food from harvests over which they have 
no say. They work when ordered to do so: someone else 
decides what will be sown, what will be plowed or mowed, 
and so forth. These are not the first plantations in 
history. They existed under the Roman Empire, in colonial 
Brazil, in antebellum Virginia. They existed, in Russia 
from the sixteenth century to 1861. But it is very easy to 
see why an ideological regime - a regime whose ideology is 
the sort of socialism that took shape in Western Europe 
during the nineteenth century - cannot recognize a kolkhoz 
for what it is. To do so would involve a contradiction 
that would destroy the legitimacy of that ideology. 96 
In other words, there are strong reasons for preserving 
the party and the state monopoly over the means of 
orientation, and for not letting the regime 'deteriorate' 
into a more simple form of authoritarianism. Ideology 
may not be the prime mover to the exten~ that ,Besancon 
claims. But it cannot be neglected. That there are, 
similarities between the short-term fluctuations in 
all contemporary states does not imply that the Soviet 
Union is a state like any other - to be, analysed in exactly 
the same manner as states in which the ruling establishment 
does not 'control 'the ,five major power monopolies. The 
most important question to be raised with respect to the 
development of the Soviet Union stiil remai~s: what will 
I 
be the long-term consequences of con~inuing functional 
democratisa'tion? Can the long duration of the post~Stalin 
NEP be explained as a consequence of the increasing latent 
strength of the ruled? 97 ' ' 
_ 44 _ 
9. SHORT-TERM FLUCTUATIONS: 
INTERMEDIATE REGIMES 
,The third model that I want to discuss is devoted 
explicitly 'to the'emergence of a specific type of, 
, " 
political regime, and was fi:\:'st introduced by the Polish 
economist Kalecki. 98 'A furtqer'development of his model 
by Skouras led to an interesting discussion between him 
and Post and Wright on the question of whether the rise 
and fall of political regimes can be studied without taking 
• ' ,99 
long-term development processes into account. 
Then~tion 'Of an 'intermediat~ regime' has,been 
developed to account for 'a new historical phenomenon', 
wliich does not'fit traditional analytic categories. 
Intermediate regimeshave'emerged in Third World states 
which at the time of achieving independence had riot 
developed an 'indigenous 'capitalist class and in which 
the 'feudal' 'class was insignificant or 'politically, divided 
and inef,fectual. The shortest description 'of the inter-' 
mediate reginie ,is "the rule of: the lower middle class 
throughsta te-capi talism' .,1 OOori'ecohld also' define 
an intermediate regime as an antagonistic alliance 
between military men and bureaucrats,' who seek support 
from the mass, of ,the "population and therefore tend to use 
populist and nationalist' rhetoric. 
Why does Kalecki' speak of intermediate regimes? First, 
they are intermediate bel1:ween: Capitalism and sociali'smr 
iri the sense that the state aims at owning a large part, 
of'the means of production and control a large part of 
investment, though there remains a significant role for 
private ownership, in particular of industrial means of 
production, and the institution of private property 
remains respected. In the second place they are inter-
mediate because they ~end to represe!nt the intei:ests of 
the lower middle clas s in the towns .. and, ,the ,rich :or 
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medium-rich peasants, which can be considered as inter-
mediate strata between the upper (landed) classes as 
the main owners of the· means of production and the lower 
classes., the poor peasants, the urban workers and the 
urban poor. In the third place they tend to be inter-
mediate between the Western and the Soviet bloc by follow-
ing.a neutral or non-aligned foreign policy. 
Intermediate regimes tend to have a similar programme: 
they attempt in the first place to achieve through 
nationalisations some degree of economic emancipation 
for foreign capital. Secondly, they try to carry out land 
reforms in order to eliminate ·the traditional landed 
oligarchy. Thirdly, they try to assure continuous economic 
growth, which i.s necessary if they are to keep the support 
of the urban population i,n particular.. Examples of inter-
mediate regimes, which Kalecki first discussed, were 
.India and Turkey and later Bolivia. Other examples would 
be Egypt under Nasser, or Peru under Velasco. 
On the basis of this model Skouras has tried to 
assess the prospects for industrialisation 0·£ such regimes, 
but without giving empirical references to the develop-
ment processes of specific Third World countries. 
In their comments on Skouras's article Post and 
Wright therefore raise the question: 
Should scholars be concerned with discerning categories 
of regime and then refining each of these in order to 
facilitate the labelling of specific countries at 
specific points in time? Or should we try to identify 
fundamental processes which underly all regimes and thus 
.permit comparisons to be made but which take different 
concrete forms in. different places and times? We would 
take the latter position, and suggest that the two 
basic processes involved are those of class arid state 
formation, themselves of course very clpsely related. I .OI 
In their brief reply they are not able to indicate 
further what they con·sider to be the nature and dynamic. 
of these 'fundamental processes' and how they are in fact 
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interconnected. They do point out, however, that Skouras 
does not make any mention of the military which have 
been the main instigators of these kinds of regimes. 
One could include Japan after the Meiji restoration; 
the young Turks in the 1920s) and similar groups within 
the military in Egypt, in Peru, in Algeria, in Lybia 
and so on. Clearl~ it is quite insufficient to simply 
speak of 'lower middle class '.. To take the role of 
the military into account also points to the fact that 
the d.evelopment of such political regimes cannot be divorced 
from the international context. Many 'intermediate regimes' 
could also be called 'military nationalist' in the sense 
that such· regimes tend to be very concerned with the 
international power position of their state, with a possible 
loss of independence or autonomy, or a threatening'decline 
of its international power position. 
Though the rise and fall of political regimes should 
indeed, as Post and Wright argue, be connected to longer-
term processes, their fate cannot be understood or ex-
plained without taking the dynamic of short-term'fluctuations 
into'account. 'Intermediate regimes' have not'been'very 
durable. They were certainly not intermediate in between 
capitalism and socialism in the sense that they moved their 
societies in the direction of socialism. They were short~ 
term fluctuations in the direction of ",'soft' regimes, which 
could not last, because of the tension between the combined 
emphasis on 'accumulation' and 'legitimation' that'such 
regimes attempted to realize. The combined force of 
international interdependencies, especially the'influence 
of Great Powers and of the 'internationalisation of 
capital, and the large degree of unevenness between 
rulers and rU,led within Third World countries, has changed 
many intermediate regimes into some form of more 'harsh' 
and often more aut:horitarian '~egiines ,"'str~ssing'accumulation 
through foreign capital rather than legit,imation~ 
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Many harsh regimes in the Third World, however, after a 
period in which capital accumulation and economic growth 
have been stressed to the detriment of redistribution 
and legitimation, appear to find it necessary to 
liberalise or democratise to some extent, and in any case 
to take more account of the needs and demands of the 
less privileged groups of the population. 
The development of .cont.emporary Third World states 
is more difficult to analyse than that of either the 
advanced capitalist or the communist industrial states. 
They are more dependent upon Great Power competition 
and upon the development of the international economy, 
within which their power resources are severely limited. 
Nevertheless, it is more fruitful to analyse their 
development in terms of a combination between longer-term 
developmental ·tendencies and short-term fluctuations 
than.to search for the structure and functioning of different 
statically-conceived types of regimes or political 
systems. The great variety that can be observed among the 
political regimes in the contempory Third World is due to 
the fact that the patterns of their short-term 
fluctuations are not synchronous, do not run parallel. 
The· 'soft' regime of Allende in Chili coincided with 
developments toward very 'harsh' regimes in Brazil, 
Uruguay and Argintina. Now the pattern is reversed, 
the Pinochet regime in Chili coincides with a movement 
towards a much 'softer' regime in Brazil. 
It will be clear that these are simply examples that 
indicate that the kind of approach I advocate can be quite 
fruitful. A better-grounded model can only be advanced 
by tracing the developmental patterns of a large number 
of Third World countries. Nevertheless, the contradictory 
long-term trends towards oligarchisation and democratisation 
combined with tension between the accumulation and legiti-
mation functions of states also appear to be a useful starting 
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point for more. adequate analysis.of the development of 
contemporary Third World states. 
10. CONCLUSION 
'HARSH' AND 'SOFT.' REGIMES 
The most difficult problem in comparative analysis is 
the relationship between similarities and differences. 
Even if it is possible to show certain similarities in 
the state formation processes in different parts of the 
contemporary world, the question remains whether the 
differences between them do not alS!o condition·the 
form in wh!i!ch similarities occur. if one speaks, for 
example, of 'harsh' and 'soft' regimes, the differences 
between contemporary states affect the precise meaning 
. of what 'harshness' and 'softness ,. in fact constitute. 
In my discussion of short-term fluctuations in advanced 
capitalist states I have· not spoken about movements from 
'harsh' to 'sof~' regimes,.because in parliamentary multi-
party democracies, changes in government make but very 
marginal differences in that sense. One may say· that the 
process of functional democratisation combined with 
secularisation, the progressive "disenchantment of the 
world' (Weber), leads to the undermining of the 
traditional ways in which ruling establishments justified 
themselves and were considered to be 'legitimate' by 
the population. At all levels of society, rulers now 
have to justify themselves more and more through their 
actual performance. But certain fluctuations can be observed, 
though they do not run quite parallel with' regime changes. 
In the late 1960s a democratisation movement consisting 
mainly of students, intellectuals, social workers and so on, 
emerged in the United States and Western Europe. This 
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produced a shock reaction among the ruling establishment 
and a certain loss of nerve. The most visible results 
were the events of May 1968 in France. The unintended 
result of this democratisation movement, however, has 
been increased centralisation and oligarchisation, 
particularly in the field of higher education. When. the 
ruling establishment discovered that the threat was less 
serious than it had at first believed, a swing backwards 
occurred: the ruling establishment reasse;rted. itself and 
became less easily intimidated. We also see the develop-
ment of a 'new conservative' ideology, particularly in 
the United States. But it is difficult to say that the 
political regimes in the United States and Western Europe 
have become 'harsh'. 
The extent of short-term fluctuations, .the intensity 
and distance of swings from one direction to the other from 
'soft' to 'harsh' and vice versa, appear to have been 
much stronger, both in certain communist countries 
(Czechoslovakia is a case in pOint, though the swings 
of the pendulum in China have also been considerable) 
and the Third World. One may perhaps say that the more 
stable and advanced is the development of political 
democratisation f the less drastic will be the swings 
between political regimes. Such a generalisation can be 
connected to the pejorative meaning which the term 'regime' 
has in ordinary language, as it refers to a form of govern-
ment which is rather authoritarian and arbitrary, in 
the sense of not being bound and controlled through 
legal and constitutional procedures. 
Fluctuations between political regimes may also .be 
connected to other devel()pments - long anr;'! short-term -
which I have not discussed. The conflict between generations, 
for example, may be quite important. If the ruling 
establishment does not take into consideration the need 
to provide sufficient chances for members of the younger 
- s.o -
generation-to. rise in the institutional hierarchy, whether 
of political parties, the bureaucracy or the military, 
swings may be more dras'tic. The struggle for succession 
of leadership may be a relatively autonomous source of 
political fluctuation. But again, only empirical 
analysis can help to assess the relative weight of 
different longer and short-term processes. 
For all these reasons a general des'cription of the 
nature of short-term political fluctuations would be 
prema ture. To speak of movements between 'ha'rsh' 'to 
'soft' regimes or 'harsher' or 'softer' regimes has no 
more than a sensitising and orienting function. These 
metaphors can acquire a more precise meaning only on 
the basis of an analysis of the longer-term'develbpment 
processes 'of specific societies. To complicate matters 
even further, a 'harsh'regime can be a weak regime 
in the ,sense that its capacity to rule and to affect 
the development of its society may be very limited, 
whereas a ,'soft' regime can be a 'strong' regime able 
to mobilise large parts of' thepopulatibn and with 
considerable capacity to steer 'the development of its 
so'ciety in a' desired direction;' The need for more 
nuanced concepts, with which gradual'differences can 
be indicated, remains very great. 
If we provisionally sum up the results 6f this 
inquiry, we can say that the most important differences 
between contemporary states in terms of degrees of 
'harshness', or 'softness,' are related, first, to'whether 
they are pristine or secondary n,ation-states. In both' 
respects the time of entry of ' a state into the. 'contemporary 
world' may have important consequences for the question 
whether the five major power resources are monopolised 
or fragmented and, if they are monopolised, whether 
or not these monopolies are controlled bya singie political 
party in conjunction with the state-apparatus. 
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These differences also determine'the specific 
patterns in which ,s'imilarities in the development of 
. . , 
contemporary states work themselves out. The tension 
between functional democratisation .and oligarchisation 
on the one hand, and between accumulation and legiti-
mation on the other hand, are shared by all"contemporary 
states. We can explain the underlying pattern of 
short-:-term polit:ical·fluctuations with reference to 
such an orienting model, bi.it the specific patterns of 
different states are neither identical nor synchronous 
in-time. We can also postulate a relationship between 
the -two long-term trends: the more functional the progress 
of democratls'ation, the greater the tension between the 
demands of 'accumulation' and 'legitimation I will' 
become.. For .that reason, if the constitutional and 
political. party structure of a contemporary state does 
not provide sufficient means and possibilities to 
accommodate these tensions,'itspolitical ,system.will 
become more uns'table in the sense 'that a qUick 'succes:-
sion of regimes or policies is likely. Such a .situation 
will be experienced as 'crisis', as is currently, the 
case in most contemporary s.tates. The improvement of 
'political democracy', as the institutional framework 
to conta:in the tensions inherent in the development. of 
contemporar~ state-societies, the~efore remains very 
, important. 
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NOTES 
1. The first issue of the new journal of the International 
Political Science Association, the International Political 
Science Review (vol. I, no. 1, 1980) happens to be devoted 
to 'Studies-in Systems ·Trans·formation' .... 
On corporatism in general, see f.e. Philippe Schmitter 
"Sti'll the Century of Corporatism?" "The Review of Politics, 
XXXVI, 1974, pp.' 85-131; Tn Latin America James M. Malloy ed. 
Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America, Pittsbur9"h, 
1977, and in Western Europe Leon de Wolff, Sociaal de'mocratie 
en Neo-Corporatisme in Jan Bank, Martin Ros en Bart Tromp ed. 
Het Eerste Jaarboek voor hetDemocratisch Socialisme, 
Amsterdam 1979, pp. 41-71. 
~. In his Asian Drama. An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations 
(New York, 1968) Gunnar Myrdal has introduc~d the term 'soft 
states' to indicate the limited capacity for social transfor-
mation due to the lack of social discipline of most Asian states, 
which he observed in the time during which he made his 'study: 
But Myrdal's ink was hardly dry, when a number of the same 
states began showing tendencies of becoming 'harsh' states, 
with authoritarian governments attempting to disCipline the 
population and to create more favourable conditions for 
capitalist accumulation, as Jan Breman has tried to demonstrate 
in his "Het·nieuwe regime in Azie: de overgang vande weke 
naar de harde staat" Internationale Spectator (XIII, 3, 
March 1977,pp. 137-152). But Breman rightly remarks that 
such.a harsh regime does not have to be a s trongregime in . the 
sense of being effective in the. realisation of its aims •. 
There are two polarities to be distinguished: 'weak' versus 
'strong' and "soft' versus 'harsh'·. Both have to be' made 
mor~ precise if they are to be more than suggestive meta-
phors. See also Koen' Koch, Terrorisme en de ontwikkeling 
naareen 'sterke' staat~ Transaktie, j.97,·n6; 1,1978, 
pp. 41..,49 .. 
3. Edwin·G. Reischauer and John K. Fairbank. East Asia: The 
Great Tradition, Boston, 1960, pp. 117-118 •. 
4. See Mark Elvin, The Pattern of' the Chinese Past, London, 1973. 
5. Norbert Elias, What is Sociology? English translation by 
Stephen Mennell and Grace Morissey of Was ist Soziologie? 
MUnchen, 1970. London, 1978, esp. Ch. 2, Game Hodels, pp. 71-104. 
6. See Elvin, op.cit., ch. 12 and Hilda Hookham. A Short History 
of China, London, 1969. ch. 9 and 12. During the Bing period there were 
even urban revolts: textile workers rose against tax 
collectors (p. 162). 
7. Hookham, op.cit., p. 83. 
8. Idem, p. 81-84. 
9. Elvin, ·op.cit., p. 69. 
10. Ibidem 
11. Elvin, op.cit., p. 235. 
12. William Hinton, Fanshen, Harmondsworth, 1972 (1966), 
esp. ch. 2-4, pp. 29-66. 
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13. For an analysis of the problematic character of this claim see 
Rupert Emerson. Self-determination Revisited in the Era: of 
Decolonization. Occasional Paper no. 9. Centre for International 
Affairs, Harvard University, December 1964. 
14. ~U~ert Emerson, From Empire to Nation: The Rise to Self-Assertion 
of Asian and African Peoples, Boston, 1960, esp. part Two. The 
autonomy of the nation, pp. 89-213. Karl W. Deutsch, 
Nationalism and Social Communication, C~ridge, 
Mass. 1953, esp. ch. 1 and Eugen Lemberg Nationalismus (2 vol.) 
Reinbek bei Hamburg, 1964, esp. Vol. II, ch. III,B, pp. 29-52. 
For a sharp critical analysis of the doctrine of nationalism 
Elie Kedourie Nationalism, London, 19,60. The intellectual origins 
of nationalism are discussed extensively in Hans Kohn The Idea 
of Nationalism, New York, 1944. " 
15. See Norbert Elias. Processes of State Formation and Nation 
Building. Transactions of the Seventh ,World Congress of Sociology 
Sofia, 1972, vol. III, pp. 274-284. 
16. "(Vietnam) possesses more than twenty centuries of recorded 
history, and Vietnamese nationalists would claim much- more: 
Ho Chi Minh wrote a polemical history of Vietnam in 1942, which 
dated its origins to 2879 B.C . ...... The depth of the Vietnamese 
people's consciousness of their oWn history would astonish the 
far less imaginative nationalists and relic-worshippers of North 
America and of Western Europe. In'1964, Hanoi children were 
shovm animated film cartoons which attempted to depict life in 
the legendary Vietnamese kingdom of Van-Lang, a kingdom which was 
supposed to have come to an end, after being ruled by eighteen 
glorious sovereigns, in the third century B.C. The purpose of 
these cartoons was to show that in this kingdom even a heroic 
child had once managed to defeat aseemingiy unvincible invader 
king .... " Alexander l'l'oodside Communi ty and Revolution in Vietnam, 
Boston 1976, p. 1-2. The fact that Vietnam has been a dynastic 
state for more than twenty centuries is a neglected element in the 
explanation of why the Vietnamese have been able to first aefeat 
France and later so successfully resist the American intervention, 
,that the American government felt forced to withdraw its troops 
and negotiate an end to the war. 
17. Ernest Renan Qu' es;'t-ce gu' une nation?' Paris, 1882. H,is own 
answer: "Une nation, c'est ,pour nous une arne, un esprit,une 
famille spirituelle, resultant dans', Ie ,passe, de souvenirs, de 
sacrifices, de gloires, souvent de deuils et de regret communs; 
dans Ie present, du desir de continuer a vivre ensemble". 
~8. See Elias; op.cit., esp. par. 4. 
19. Eugen Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen. The Modernization of Rural 
France 1870-1914. Stanford, 1976. 
20. See Alfred Vagts. A History of Militarism. Civilian and Military. 
Rev.ed., New York, 1959, ch. 4, pp. 104-129. 
21.' " •••.. all the national movements of the nineteenth century ...•. 
have been decisively though unintentionally stimulated by revoluti-
onary France and Napoleon. Both Pan-Germanism andPan-Slavi'sm 
- 54 -
have' their roots in these traditions". Frederick Hertz. 
J\i'ationality in History and politics," London, i9 p.164,. 
22. 'In the new introduction (1968) to The CiviliSing Process Norbert 
Elias has shown that in Talcott Parsons' concept of the "social 
system" "the image of the natioJ;1 as community can bE) discerned ••.. 
in the twentieth century sociological models ofa normally 
unchanging "social system" the desired ideal of a harmonious inte-
grationof all parts of the nation is ..••. presented (mingled 
wi th realistic observations) as something ,that eXists, a f!'lct .••. 
the nation-state existing here and now is idealized". Norbert 
Elias The Civilizing Process, vol. I, New York and Oxford, 1978, 
p. 243. 
23. See K. Koch. De nieuwe marxistische staatstheorie : (her)ontdek-
king van de grenzen van een structureel functionalistisch para-
digma.Acta Politica, XIV, January 1979, pp, 3-70; G. van 
Benthem van den Bergh. Is a Marxist theory of the State possible? 
in J. Goudsblom e.a. Human Figurations, Amsterdam, 1977, pp. 
157-179; E.P. Thompson The Poverty of T~iry, London, 1979, 
esp. the ti,tle essay, pp. 193-359, a sca ng critique of 
Althlisserian a-historical, structuralist Marxism'.' 
24. For a more extended discussion of the specific character of 
'state' interdependencies see G. van Benthem van den Bergh. 
The Interconnections between State and Class Formation. 
ActaPolitica, XI, July 1976, pp. 289~312. 
25. Not only in Marxism, though. Elias has used game models asa 
didactic devise in order to show that as the course of the 
game is relatively autonomous from the intentions of in,dividual 
players ,'yet does not exist apart from and does not consist of 
anything but the moves of the players, so it is wi th the develop-
ment, of human societies, But, as he says ,this is difficult to 
gra'sp: "Metaphors are used which oscillate constantly between 
the idea that the course of the game can be reduced to the 
actions of individual playe'rs and the other idea that it is of 
a supra~personal nature", Norbert Elias What is Sociology? p.91. 
26. See H.J .M. Claessen and Peter Skalnik ed. Th'e Early State, 
The Hague, '1978; Rene Hagestein Ed. Stoeien met Staten, , 
Leiden, 1980. In most o'f the anthropological literature the te:t:m'state 
fonnation' is used as synonymous with state origins. But it may be 
better not to think in te:rrnS of. such discontinuities, but to 
see state formation' as an ongoing process of transformation of 
the attacK and defense uni'ts, in which men have always lived 
and which still form the primary unit of identification 
and solidarity for most people. The discussion about state origins often 
degenerates into chicken and egg questions such as: 'did strati-
fication (class formation)' produce the state?' or 'is stratifi-
cation the consequence of the fonnation' of the state'. The deve-
lopment of 'early states,' rather raises the question:, why and how did 
a >greater degree of specialisation and ,insti tutionalisation of 
functions of rule emerge? But the problem of demarcating 
chiefdoms from early states (see th,e phapter by Ronald Cohen in 
, The Early state) shows that there is no clear caesura between a 
'non-state' and a 'state-society' - as there is no clear caesura 
between dynastic and nation-states . ' 
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27. See Claessen and Skalnik, op.cit. In their definition of the 
early state they speak explicitly of rulers and ruled, but do 
not use the term class. 
28. In the introduction to the Dutch translation of The Established 
and the Outsiders (London, 1965)' Norbert Elias begins to develop 
a general model of established-outsider relations of which he 
considers the relations between social classes to be but one 
·form. Though he has not worked out this model very extensively, 
it makes more sense than the attempt made by some l'~arxists 
to reduce all ethnic, religious, caste or 'national' conflicts 
to class relations or deny that such conflicts are really 'real'. 
29. That has, for example, been the case in Malaysia. The political 
development of Malaysia is dominated by the ethnic (in Malaysia 
itself it is often seen as 'racial') conflict between the two 
majority groups of the population, the Chinese and the Malays. 
Both can be seen as established and outsider groups at the same 
time: the Chinese control most economic power resources, the 
Malays most 'political' power resources (bureaucracy and military). 
The Malays as the originally indigenous people - Bumiputra's -
also claim the 'nation' for themselves, a claim strengthened by 
the fact that the Head of State is in turn one of the Sultans, 
the former rulers in what became the British colony of Malaya. 
After fighting between Chinese and Malayans in 1969 a 'harsh 
regime' emerged. The development of Nalaysia is one of the many 
illustrations of the fact that 'ethnicity' and ethnic conflict 
are a function of. state formation. l'lost of what we now call 
ethnic groups or, significantly 'national minorities' became 
incorporated in a state not their own, having had at a prior stage 
of their history if not a state, at least a form of rule or of 
regularised relations among their constituent parts. 
30. Immanuel Wallerstein (The Modern World System: Capitalist Agri-
culture and the Origins of the European World Economy in the 
Sixteenth Century New York, etc. 1974) pays some attention 
to the question why 'as of 1950, the stage was set in Europe but 
not elsewhere for the creation of a capitalist world economy' 
(p.63). He analyses the differences between Western-
Europe and China, i.e. 'between a feudal system and a world 
empire based on a prebendal bureaucracy', having also a different 
'agronomic thrusts, of Europe towards cattle and wheat" and of 
China towards rice'. But Wallerstein compares only the 
differences in initial conditions. Once his 'world-system' has 
come into being, its development is supposed to account fully for the 
development of each of its different parts.As the 'world-system' is a 
European world-economy, his analysis had to become heavily 
ethnocentric - in the same way as dependency theory in general, 
despite the intentions of its original proponents. The weight 
and importance of cultural and Doliticalcontinuities in Third 
World societies is thus neglected. For critical analyses of world-
system and dependency approaches s~e Tony Smith: The Underdevelop-
ment of Development Literature: The Case of Dependency Theory, 
World Politics, vol. 31, no. 2, January 1979, !.=p. 247-288; Jan de Vries, 
Het We:r:eldmcdel van ~7allerstein, Theo:r:etische Geschiedenis, Vol. III, 3, 1976, 
pp. 105-122; L, Blusse, H.L. Wesselin<:!, G.D. Winius, ed. History and Under-
develc:ptEint, Essays an Underdevelg;ment and Eurcpean Exoansion in Asia and 
~. I.eiden and Paris, 1980. 
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31. Cf. Norbert Elias, tiber den Prozess der Zivilisation, Bern und 
MUncnen, 1969, voL II~; PJ?~ 69'"72; ~ "The absence of slave 
imports and slave labour gives the working people also as a 
low~~ stratum a considerable social strength. ..• And the 
technical development of Western Europe, including the developrrent 
of money to the specific form of 'Capital' which is character-
istic for Western Europe, has the absence of slave labour 
and the development of free labour as a precondition" (p. 72, 
my translation) • ~ 
32. The long-term direction of that development can also be summa-
rised as 'increasing interdependencies', in the sense ,that 
more and more ,people become dependent on each other for,a 
greater number and variety of specialised functions. The 
extent, density and geographical scope of functional inter-
dependencies between people has become ever greater since 
the late Middle Ages, until it has become a world society, 
with fewer and fewer people - only a tiny number'of forest 
peoples - living outside of its web 'of interdependencies. 
33. To speak of 'econ~niic' interdependencies is better 'than to 
speak of 'capitalism', because the term 'capitalism' suggests 
not only a prime mover, but also the developrna,nt of a new unchanging 
'system' instead of an ongoing process of figurational change. 
He're we find ' one of the central problems in Marxism. The 
, ideological and conceptual consistency of a 'Marxist' analy~ 
" tical' framework is dependent on the assumption that the 'fun-
'damen tal' or 'essential' characteristics of 'capit;alism' 
remain the same through a~l of its earlier or later phases. 
'Late' capitalism is; still capitalism: underlying changes in 
form, there remains an wcnanging ess,ence. ,When further queried 
about 'this' assumption Marxists either end up in tautology: 
capitalism is capitalism because',it is based on the cqntra-
diction between labour and capital (q.e .d.) or else they shout or 
"stammer: exploitation and oppression. 
34. Nico Wilterdink. The Figurational Analysis of , Economic 
Processes. Paper fo'r the Conference The Civilising Process 
and Figurational Sociology. Balliol C01lege, Oxford, 
5-6 January 1980. 
35. The pioneering work of Alexander 'Gerschenkron. Economic Back-
wardriess in Historical Perspective. Cambridge 1962 and 
Continuity in History and Other Essays, Cambridge, 1968 
,should be mentioned here. See also Ellen Kay Trimberger, 
Revolution from Above': Military Bureaucrats and Development 
in Japan, Turkey, Egypt and Peru, New Brunswick, 1~78 and 
Theda Skokpol, States and Social Revolutions, Cambridge, 1979. 
36. See Norbert Elias, 'Wnatis SOciology?"op.cit., p. 141. 
37. For a' first attempt at synthesis on the basis of such a 
perspective - be it,rather ethnocentric (see note 30) - see 
Daniel Chirot, Social Change, in ,the Twentieth Century, 
New York 1977. Also Ralph Pettmann,' State and Class, A Socio-
logy of International Affairs, London 1979. 
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38. Wallerstein's 'world-system' analysis tends to neglect the 
differences between incorporation into the 'world~economy' of 
'external arenas' and the creation of colonial empires, 
leading to the development of colonial states at the end of 
the 19th century. On the concept of 'colonial state' see 
J. van Baal 'Tussen kolonie en nationale staat: de koloniale 
staat' in H.J.M. Claessen, J. Kaayk 'and R.J.A. Lambregts 
ed. Dekolonisatie en Vrijheid, Assen-Arnsterdam, 1976, 
pp. 92-105. 
39. On this point see Tony Smith, op.cit. 
40. See also Charles Tilly. Western State-Making and Theories 
of Political Transformation, the concluding chapter of 
Charles Tilly ed. The Formation of National States in Western 
Europe. Princeton 1975 (pp. 601-629). Tilly stresses the 
differences between state formation in Western Europe and the 
Third World. 
41. See H.J.M. Claessen and P. Skalnik, op.cit. 
42. This point is further elaborated in my 'Is a-Marxist theory 
of the state possible" ,op.cit. See also Karl Krarup. . 
Acta Sociologica, vol. 
43. Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and 
Economic Origins of Our Time. Boston, 1944. See also 
Rodney Hilton a.o. The .Transition from Feudalism to 
Capitalism. London 1976; David Landes The Unbound Prome-
theus,: Technological Change and Industrial Development in 
Western. Europe from 1750 to the Present. In these and 
mos.t other studies on this sub ject, however, it is either 
- 'capitalism' or the 'industrial revolution' which is seen as 
the decisi ye discontinuity. Only Norbert Elias places state 
formation processes in the center of attention, and justifi-
ably so, because the development of relatively stable mono-
poliesof violence 'and taxation was an important precondition 
for the rapid acceleration of -'productive' processes, culmi-
nating in the first and second industrial revolutions. 
44. I have taken my clue from remarks made by Norbert Elias 
on various occasions during his lectures -on state formation 
processes at the Ins·titute of Social Studies I The Hague, 
between 1970 and 1977. See also Robert Michels Political 
Parties, New York, 1959 (reprint of the first English ed. 1915) 
and Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation' and Opposition 
New Haven and London 1971, who both stress the oligarchic 
tendencies within 'democratic' organisations or polities. 
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45. See Elias. What is Sociology, op.cit., p. 86-89. Members 
of the ruling establishment of two-tier societies 'imagine 
.that the course of the game, as (they see) it unfold before 
(them), is more or less transparent ..... Members of pre-
industrial oligarchic elites - for example courtiers, men 
like the Duc de Saint Simon, memoir writer in the time of 
Louis XIV - usually felt that they had a precise knowledge 
of the unwritten rules governing the game at the hub of the 
state society ••.• The game played by . the group on the 
upper level will be. viewed by the players not as a game 
proce~s but as an accumulation of actions of individuals." (p.87). 
That ~s the reason why historiography in dynastic states pays 
only atte:ntion to King .and Court. because it is assurredthat Kinq 
and Court control and determine the fate of society as a whole 
The subjected classes (serfs, slaves, peasants) are presumed '. 
to be objects, not subjects of history. For an Asian 
example see Charavit Kasetsiri Thai Historiography mimeo, 
Faculty of Liberal Arts, Thamassat University, Bangkok, 1980, 
and The Rise of Ayudhya: A History of Siam in the Fourteenth 
and Fifteenth Centuries, Kuala Lumpur, 1976. 
46. Norbert Elias. Processes of State Formation and Nation 
Building, op.cit., p. 8. This implies also a change in the 
nature of social stratification, i.e. fran a figuration fOJ:llled by 
estates to one formed by social classes. 
47. Idem, What is Sociology? op.cit. p. 89. 
48. See' further G. van" Benthem van den Bergh. On the· Development 
of the Monopoly of Violence of the State. Paper for IPSA 
Conference, Moscow, August 1979. (Dutch version in Symposion, 
vol. r, no.· 3, 1.9J30 ~) 
49. See :NorbertElias .. What :is Sociology? op.ci-t..:.., esp". ch. 3, 
Game Models ;pp.' 71- io 4. 
50. An indication' of the increasing need for coordination - and 
the role of state institutions in this respect - is the 
growing: importance and precision of 'timing'and time 
schedules in the form of standardized calendars and clocks. 
See Norbert Elias, Essay on Time, pubiished in the Dutch trans-
'lation by G. van Benthem van den Bergh in De Gids, 1974, 
no. 9-101 pp. 600-6081 1975, no. 1-2; 5-6 and 91 
pp. 50~591 3~7-377 and 587-600. 
51. See H.M. Helmers, R.J. Mokken, R.C.Plijter and F.N. Stokman, 
Graven naar Macht, Amsterdam, 1975. Also R. Michels, op.cit. 
52. Th9ugh Michels speaks of an 'iron law of oligarchy'what he 
in fact ShOilS is the strong tendency towards oligarchisation 
within all. formal organisations with 'more than one level of 
decision-making. 
53. See Norbert Elias. Processes of State Formation and Nation 
Building, op.cit. To avoid a misunderstanding to which 
Marxists in particular are prone, as they attach much value 
to their conception of an unchanging essence of capitalism 
the power balance between organised employers and trade . 
unions remains uneven - but less uneven than in former times 
and less uneven at the central level of the state than at the 
"'~~.j-~ .... " "'TId shop-floor levels. 
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54. "\\fer nicht zuninunt, der ninunt, I-lenn Andere zunehmen, ab". 
Cited in R.F. Beerling, 'Hydra Macht', l'Iijsgerig Perspectief, 
vol. II, no. 5, May 1971. 
55. In that manner 'non-aligned'states can turn weakness into 
strength. 
56. From the earliest phases of state formation processes 
interstate competition has been a crucial aspect of the 
development of relatively stable control monopolies of 
violence and taxation. The French monarchs first acquired 
an institutionalised monopoly of taxation in the course of 
the hundred years war with England. See Norbert Elias, 
The Civilising Process, vol. II, English tra'1slation, forthccming, 1980. 
57. There is, however, currently a tendency to overestimate the 
power of transnational corporations, because they are seen 
as the. embodiment of 'capitalism'. This tendency has less 
to do with realistic analysis than with attributing blame 
to the transnationals for most of the evils of the present Ivorld. 
The proble~ with large corporations - as Marx already noted -
is not so much their power or their 'profit-motive', but 
the ccercive character of carpetition, as it occurs both between states 
and be~n corporations. Ccrrpeti tion bettoleek lr~ak states often rrekes it 
pcssible for transnational corporations to play off different national 
governments against each other. The other problem is the 
worldl-lide uniformity of their technology and production 
rrethods, which do not provide sufficient employment chances in 
late industrialising countries and hinder the development of 
more autonomous and 'appropriate' forms of technology in the 
latest industrialising societies. 
58. A. de Swaan. Uitgaansbeperkingen en Uitgaansangst: over de 
verschuiving van Bevelshuishouding naar Onderhandelings-
huishouding, De Gids, 1979, no. 8, pp. 483-510. 
59. It is, however, impossible to make a· general classification 
of power resources, which would be valid for all human 
societies and all the phases of their development. Both 
power resources themselves and their relative weight and inter-
connections change in the course of development of human 
societies. It may nevertheless be useful to identify some 
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